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ABSTRACT

Examination of the social development of Iran reveals that quantitative leaps in the growth of traditional communication indicators, such as the mass media, did not necessarily mean growth in the social communication system as a whole. The intrinsic communication needs of modern Iranians for identity, legitimacy, and community have remained unfulfilled by the mode of development Iran has experienced in the last 25 years. Prior to the revolution of 1979, the population tended toward religious and egalitarian attitudes combined with nationalistic preferences, while the government ideological positions were relatively unpopular. Many of the development objectives put forth by the government became Iran's most important social problems, to the degree that the country's rate of growth had declined to a virtual standstill in 1978. Iran's communication system at the time consisted of the traditional media, both religious and secular, the theatre, the press, publishers, broadcasting, advertising, and the film industry. The evolving Islamic policy toward mass communication will restrict it to propagation of Islamic views and culture. A period of uneven and rapid growth in the economy and the accumulation of communications capital and infrastructure may lead to social and political disintegration or revolution. (HTH)

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SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND COMMUNICATION INDICATORS IN DEVELOPMENT PLANNING: A CASE STUDY OF IRAN

By MAJID TEHRANIAN

Communication and Society 5

UNESCO

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5. Socio-economic and communication indicators in development planning: *A case study of Iran*

Majid Tehranian, formerly a Professor and Director of the Iran Communications and Development Institute in Tehran, has a doctorate in political economy from Harvard University and has taught in various universities in Iran, the United States and the United Kingdom. He has written several books and articles on communication and modernization, including Communications Policy for National Development (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977). Unesco contracted with him the preparation of this study in 1978, and it was submitted in June 1979. The study was later up-dated however in order to include some recent developments of communication in Iran which are particularly relevant to the study because of its technical approach to communication indicators and planning.

This study is not an official document of the country it refers to. The views stated therein are the author's and do not necessarily represent the official views of Iran or those of UNESCO.

"There are three kinds of lies: lies, damned lies and statistics."

Benjamin Disraeli

Foreword

This study's objectives are three. First, to review briefly but critically - the whole concept of development and communication indicators in the light of the changing perspectives on development theory and policy of the last two decades. Second, to propose a model for the study of development and communication indicators that is at once holistic and relevant to the complexities of the processes of social development. Third, to provide as much data as possible on the Iranian situation as well as to show the data gaps for future studies.

The study cannot and will not cover the whole complex and wide range of development indicators. It focuses rather on those indicators crucial to an understanding of the evolving communication system. In so far as the communication system is defined here in the broadest possible terms, however, the study will cover also those socio-economic indicators which determine the environmental parameters of the system. These include data on population, geography, history, physical infrastructures, economic, social, political, legal and cultural systems. The study then focuses on what are termed as 'input indicators', including data on national development objectives (both in form and substance), development resources (both physical and human), and development technologies (both traditional and modern). For indicators on communication structures, the study focuses on message production, distribution and reception. The communication industries covered in this section include all of the usual ones (the press, broadcasting, printing and publishing, the film industry, advertising, telecommunications) as well as those sectors that are often neglected, i.e. the traditional media, theatre, tapes and records, libraries and documentation centres, and data publication, storage and retrieval systems (informatics). The final section of the study focuses on what might be called communication system processes, i.e. communication policies, output, impact and feedback indicators. While the section on communication structures is treated in historical terms by providing indicators for the past decade or so, the section on communication processes is proposed in an outline form for future studies.

As the above outline reveals, the study conceives of the communication system as a notional entity with its own boundaries, environmental parameters, inputs, structures, processes, outputs, impact and feedback. While this method of conceptualization of the communication system may seem too broad to manage, it has the practical virtue of drawing attention to those vital elements in the system that are often neglected. The mediacentric views of the communication system, hitherto prevalent, have underestimated the importance the primary (where messages originate) and tertiary (where messages are controlled, selectively perceived and disseminated) channels of communication by concentrating all too exclusively on the secondary channels (where messages are packaged and transmitted). This study hopes therefore to redress some of the imbalance.

The sources of this study are, in conformity with its broad scope, rather diverse. To the best of knowledge of the author, no systematic attempt has been yet made in Iran to collect and monitor data on such diverse elements of the communication system as presented here. Problems of availability and reliability of data are seriously prohibitive. Nevertheless as the present effort will hopefully demonstrate, the task is not altogether impossible and the rewards in terms of a deeper and more comprehensive understanding may be worth the effort.

The author is deeply thankful to his colleagues at Iran Communications and Development Institute who have assisted him in the compilation of data for this study. He is particularly grateful to the following colleagues who took responsibility for the different sectors of the communication system: Homa Aflatouni (tapes and records), Jamshid Akrami (the cinema), Bijan Hamzelou (broadcasting), Khosrow Jahandary (the press), Jonathan Katz (general), Abbas Malekzadeh (press services), Hormoz Mehrdad (advertising) and, Mortezz Miraftabi (printing and publishing). His debts of gratitude to his wife for preparing some of the tables and sharing the burdens of work so gracefully are immeasurable.

The author also wishes to thank UNESCO's Division of Free Flow of

Information and Communication Policies for its support in the preparation of the study. He hopes that the exploratory nature of the study is reason enough to encourage further research along the suggestions made here.

One final caveat is in order. This study was undertaken at a time of revolutionary change in Iran. It focusses primarily on the pre-revolutionary period and includes only brief references to the major post-revolutionary developments. Although the study has no claims to validity beyond this, cultural trends are notoriously persistent and do not die out with changes in political regimes. Indeed, if indicators have any use at all, they should provide tools not only for description, analysis and prescription but also for prediction. In the same way that some of the indicators in the period under study suggested future trends that have already become history, present indicators may point to future developments.

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Communications Development Indicators: Measuring the Immeasurables

The concept of development indicators owes much of its popularity to normative theories of social change. By objectifying a desired model of development, however, indicators tend to reveal as much as to conceal the normative premises upon which much of their legitimacy rests. To select a set of development indicators as opposed to other possible alternatives suggests preferences, conscious or unconscious, for certain social goals as opposed to others. Indicators thus stand as intermediate variables between development theory and development policy. While it is the function of development theory to clarify the theoretically possible choices, development policy makes choices and pursues them in practice.

Development theory itself, however, has gone through considerable transformation in the course of the last two United Nations Development Decades. Extremes of pessimism (e.g. the vicious circle of poverty theories) have given way to extreme of optimism (e.g. take-off into self-sustaining growth theories), to be in turn challenged by a new sense of realism tempered by the experiences of successes and failures of the last two decades.

In the meantime, the importance of the structural aspects of the developmental process have become better known and appreciated by most development theorists and planners. Similarly, development indicators have broadened in scope to include economic, as well as social and cultural (communications) factors. The concept of qualitative as opposed to quantitative indicators has been also introduced into the literature in order to suggest the importance of historical and structural variables. (For a review of the concepts, see UNRISD, 1970; Baster, 1973; Andress, 1973; Fox, 1974; Bernst, 1975; Land & Spileman, 1974; O'Brien et al, 1979).

A critical review of the literature on development theory and

communication policy is impossible here within the narrow limits of this essay; we shall confine ourselves therefore only to the problem of communication indicators. (For broader reviews, see Tehranian, 1979 a, b, c, d; 1980 a & b).

Indicators as Intermediate Variables

The concept of development is laden with such strong doses of evolutionary bias that any examination of its derivative concepts, such as that of 'development indicators', must guard against any facile notions of progress. Unfortunately, however, much of the literature on development as well as communication indicators has fallen prey, often unwittingly, to the linearity, one-dimensionality, and inevitability suggestive of progress along certain pre-determined sets of quantitative measures of economic and social progress. UNESCO's set of suggested minimal standards for mass media are the glaring example of such a theoretical bias. (UNESCO, 1961, p. 16). These urged that every country should provide at least the following media facilities per one thousand of population; one hundred copies of daily newspapers, fifty radio sets, twenty cinema seats, and twenty television receivers. Now that after nearly two decades, many less developed countries (LDCs) have either nearly achieved or surpassed these standards (albeit unevenly), it is increasingly apparent (to UNESCO more than to others) that more media facilities do not necessarily mean better communication or higher standards of cultural development. If anything, the contrary may be true in the context of the LDCs where media programs have been often dominated by Western imports or government propaganda. In some circumstances, such as that of Iran's, under true monarchical regime the situation had led to the development of a dualistic communication system in which the government and the opposition each possessed their own media systems and networds of communication. (For Iran, see Tehranian, 1979; for some other examples see Sampson, 1979). Communications indicators that are insensitive to the small media (transistor radios and cassettes, memeographing, xeroxing, and most important of all, tra-

ditional and informal channels of communication) cannot capture, let alone monitor, communication and social change. The growth in big media (braodcasting, the press, microwave, satellites) indicators measure primarily the availability of capital, government commitment to the expansion of the communication infrastructure, and possibly the growth of a consumer market for communications products.

The choice of communications indicators inevitably reflects a model of communication system towards which society is striving, either consciously or unconsciously. Communications indicators thus serve as intermediate variables between development theory and communications development policy. The ambition of development theory is to posit certain empirically verifiable propositions about the nature and direction of social change; development theory should deal therefore primarily with the explanation of historical facts. Development policy, by contrast, deals with 'what ought to be' rather than 'what is'. Development indicators thus serve as empirical links between these two sets of propositions. Historically irrelevant development theories often lead to wrong-headed development policies and development indicators which measure at worst the inconsequential or at best the symptomatic signs of misdevelopment.

Development vs. Developmentalism

The last two decades in world development have witnessed the growth of an ideology of growth which may be labelled as 'developmentalism'. This ideology, marked by Western ethnocentrism, sees the process of development essentially in terms of the accumulation of capital investment and the mass production of consumer goods. Development policies derived from these ideological premises, whether under capitalism, socialism or mixed economies, have been thus characterized by a kind of 'growth-mania'.

The prescriptive model of society underpinning these ideological

tendencies is an 'industrial system', developed historically in some advanced capitalist as well as developed socialist countries, that organizes life around commodities. The market-intensive, capitalist or socialist societies measure economic progress by the increase in the volume and varieties of commodities produced. As a derivative of the economic sector, social progress is also measured by the distribution of access to these commodities. In this sense, therefore, development indicators express the commodity fetichism characteristic of some advanced and highly secularized industrial systems. (Illich, 78, p. 23).

In cultural fields, the processes of mass production and homogenization of culture as well as distantiation in human communication have produced truly dramatic results. As Illich puts it:

> "Fifty years ago, most of the words heard by an American were personally spoken to him as an individual, or to somebody standing nearby. Only occasionally did words reach him as the undifferentiated member of a crowd - in the classroom or church, at a rally or a circus. Words were mostly like handwritten, sealed letters, and not like the junk that now pollutes our mail. Today, words that are directed to one person's attention have become rare. Engineered staples of images, ideas, feelings and opinions, packaged and delivered through the media, assault our sensibilities with round-the-clock regularity. Two points now become evident: 1) what is occurring with language fits the pattern of an increasingly wide range of need-satisfaction relationships; 2) this replacement of convivial means by manipulative industrial ware is truly universal, and is relentlessly making the New York teacher, the Chinese commune member, the Bantu schoolboy, and the Brazilian sergeant alike". (Illich, 1978, pp. 17-18).

In the Third World, where these processes have taken place piecemeal and unevenly, the social system is often town between a 'modernizing elite' and a 'traditional mass' that frequently live in separate quarters and centuries. What goes under the rubrics of 'development' often includes the processes of growth in physical output, its lopsided distribution among the traditional and modern sectors of the economy and society, and increasing dualism and alienation. In the meantime, the processes of increasing levels of division and alienation of labour

in the economic sphere, bureaucratization and professionalization of power and authority in the political sphere, functionalization and atomization of human relations in the social sphere, and secularization and homogenization of culture in the cultural sphere, undermine the general sense of community solidarity and well-being. As bits and watts (the indicators of information and energy units) increase in mass production, life is impoverished under a system of modernized poverty. Whereas poverty in traditional societies is made bearable by the facts of relative equality, and ethics of self-denial and mutual obligation, as well as some strong bonds of community, modernized poverty is characterized by the ethics of self-advancement and self-gratification that breeds atomistic mobility, status insecurity and anxiety, social envy, and - in the face of frustration - social disintegration, psychological regression and political aggression. The negative internalities of modernity - such as time-consuming acceleration, sick-making health-care, stupefying education, counter-communicative media, information-void news - thus outpace the positive externalities of growth and development.

Can development, therefore, have a positive meaning at all? Yes, provided that it is radically redefined to suggest something normatively very different from what it often suggests now. Increase of wealth in the process of growth and development, often taken as the fulfilment of more basic and intrinsic human needs. It should be recognized that beyond a threshold, every increase in bits and watts in mass-produced commodities may, in fact, create impoverishing wealth and yield diminishing returns on human happiness. The fulfilment of extrinsic and market-imputed needs has led to a new tyranny of professional and technocratic managers and elites as the new priests and power-wielders.(1) In the Third World, where the state and the transnational corporations are the most organized sectors of the market, 'development' objectives

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(1) Leon Trotsky and James Burnbam were perhaps the first theorists to recognise the new phenomenon explicitly under the socialist and capitalist conditions; Melvin Djilas and Ivan Illich have provided incisive and more contemporary critiques; but Alexis de Tocqueville should be credited with forecasting more than a century and a half ago the debilitating effects of all this in the rise of the "Tyranny of the majority" and the totalitarian and welfare-state dependency syndromes.

are thus defined and imposed upon the rest with cognitive arrogance. The rigid interdependence of needs and market is legitimized through appeals to the expertise of an elite whose knowledge, by its very nature, cannot be shared. Planning is thus viewed as the social engineering of human wants in the direction of state and corporate objectives.

Towards an Intrinsic Needs Strategy of Development

If we define social development (in its broadest possible sense) as a process of unfolding of the potentialities of each society in accordance with its own endogenous resources and capabilities, this becomes contingent upon the harmonious unfolding of potentialities of each of its members. The fulfilment of basic and intrinsic needs, as opposed to imputed and extrinsic ones, becomes therefore the first order of priority for such a mode of development. The late social psychologist, Abraham Maslow (1954) has provided a definition of the hierarchy of human needs which may serve as a sound beginning for the analysis of intrinsic human needs:

- physiological needs (food, air, water, behavioural space, etc.);
- safety needs (protection from weather, other species and other humans);
- belongingness and love needs (family and social groups);
- esteem needs (having the respect of oneself and one's peers in society);
- self-actualization needs (fulfilling one's potentials in one's private and public capacities);
- cognitive needs (understanding one's relations to society and comprehending order in nature and the cosmos);
- aesthetic needs (perceiving beauty and order in the experience).

If religious needs (transcending the barriers of time and space to experience infinitude) are also added to this hierarchy, the list reveals that the first orders of priority are primarily economic in nature,

while political, social, cultural, aesthetic and religious needs follow. One may reasonably argue, however, that the needs in this hierarchy present themselves to each individual and society simultaneously. Nevertheless, different individuals and social systems resolve the perennial problem of allocation of limited resources to unlimited needs differently and in accordance with their own perceptions of what is good, beautiful and true. No society or individual has the right to impose upon another its own conceptions of legitimacy. But this is, in fact, what often occurs in history through various forms of domination which may be termed 'cognitive domination'.

Cognitive domination works primarily through channels of communications, and it is therefore through communication that it can be challenged. Every child begins to learn about his biologically and socially defined place in the universe (his identity) through communication - verbal and non-verbal. The legitimacy of this place in the universe is later on rationalized and routinized primarily through educational communication - both formal and informal. His rights and obligations of membership and participation in the community are defined once again primarily through the channels of communication; the price system as an information system defines the limits of his claims on goods and services; the legal system communicates his rights and obligations; the political system delineates the limits of his power in changing the constraints of the previous two systems, and cultural and communications systems often serve to uphold the sense of community which emerges from all this. No wonder that the words 'communication' and 'community' are of the same root, nor that excommunication was the greatest punishment an individual could suffer in closed traditional societies. Communication provides the organic ties that are absent from the mechanical solidarity of prices, laws and systems of power.

Communication Needs, Resources and Indicators

Cutting across his hierarchy of needs the intrinsic communication

needs of an individual may be considered therefore to consist of his needs for identity, legitimacy and community. They provide the cement that is necessary for linking the individual's needs to those of his social system. How adequately these needs are fulfilled in a modern or modernizing society seems to be a function of the extent to which that society has provided for individual autonomy, social justice and political solidarity. In this context, the slogans of the French Revolution seem to be of profound relevance. The following set of relationships are therefore significant:

Freedom ⟶ Autonomy ⟶ Identity
Equality ⟶ Justice ⟶ Legitimacy
Fraternity ⟶ Solidarity ⟶ Community

Intrinsic needs are, however, fundamentally use values; they are not exchanges values that could be measured with some common yardstick. It is entirely possible to devise methods or indicators unique to each society that could monitor the extent of fulfillment of these needs in that particular cultural system. It would be extremely difficult, however, to apply the same yardstick across time and space. Electoral participation is one telling example of this problem. It may serve as an indicator of political participation and community feeling in societies with a tradition of parliamentary democracy, but in societies in which elections are considered fraudulent affairs it often measures the power of intimidation and coercion. The sense of community and political participation in such societies would have to be measured through indicators of participation in the more traditional or voluntary activities. In the final analysis, however, the fulfillment of intrinsic needs are qualitative measures that would have to be understood by close observation, participation and analysis.

By contrast, communication resources are quantifiable exchange values and often lend themselves therefore to measurement as indicators. The material and human resources devoted to the production, distribution and reception of messages can be defined and measured over time in order to monitor the changing configuration of messages, media and

audiences. No matter how abundant, accurate or frequent the data might be, however, the quality of the communication system would remain obscure unless we can somehow also map the extent of the satisfaction of intrinsic communications needs. A so-called 'primitive' African tribesman is perhaps better satisfied by participation in a communal tribal dance, chasing away the evil spirits and giving him a strong bond of solidarity with his fellows, than by endless exposure to American television serials. Television sets per thousand of population is thus fundamentally an idiotic way of trying to measure the extent of satisfaction of his cultural needs.

A Holistic Approach to Communication Indicators

For all these reasons, we propose here what might be called a historical and holistic approach to the study of communication indicators. Theories of communication have alternatively focussed on the message, the messenger, the media, or the audience as the critical factors in the communication process. Human communication is however predicated upon the existence of an epistemic community based on shared historical experiences and common structures of meaning, i.e. the historical context in which all of these participants in the communication chain meet and interact. To understand any communication system in its full complexity, we should therefore look at all parts of the system, including its spatial and temporal environments (geography and history), the system inputs (communication goals, resources and technologies), the structures (message production, distribution, reception), the processes (in the present context, communication policies and planning), the output (communications products and programs), impact and the feedback (communication efficacy as is reflected in audience reactions). Communication indicators should try therefore, as far as possible, to monitor changes over time in each of these categories.

This method of looking at development and communication indicators will hopefully provide a better insight into the contradictions and

discontinuities which tend to be obscured by the more linear methods. The processes of social development are, by their very nature, replete with social conflicts and contradictions. Communication and its ideological expressions in the different and competing conceptions of political identity, legitimacy, and community stand at the very centre of this tortuous process. If communication indicators serve to explain away rather than explain the essential nature of this process, they have thoroughly failed their monitoring purposes.

If the example of Iran teaches us one lesson, it is that quantitiative leaps in the growth of traditional communication indicators (i.e. the media) does not mean what it has often been imputed to mean, i.e. the growth of capacity in the communication system. Under dualistic conditions, typical of most of the Third World, it may in fact mean just the opposite.

System Parameters: Spatial and Temporal Environments

The spatial and temporal environments of the Iranian communication system may be usefully looked at in terms of two sets of variables: needs/expectations and resources/constraints. To provide a dynamic view of the development of a dualistic communication and cultural system in Iran, we will focus first on the two competing conceptions of Iranian cultural identity, moral legitimacy, and political community, i.e. the Islamic and the pre-Islamic. It will thus be shown how the intrinsic communication needs of modern Iranians for identity, legitimacy and community have remained largely unfulfilled by the social contradictions of the mode of development Iran has experienced in the last twenty-five years.

While indicators of communication needs and expectations are essentially historical and qualitative in nature, the indicators of resources and constraints may be more readily translated into some quantitative measures such as indicators of geographic features, growth in physical infrastructure, population growth, income distribution and economic growth, social mobility. Nevertheless, indicators such as political and cultural development, are still largely qualitative measures and would have to be understood in terms of a combination of qualitative and quantitative indicators.

Communication Development Needs/Expectations

Needs and expectations are notoriously subjective categories that do not easily lend themselves to measuring and monitoring. However, appropriate methodologies to monitor them can be devised and refined in order to understand the dynamics and direction of change. One such effort was made in Iran during 1974 under the auspices of a Prospective Planning Project for the National Iranian Radio Television. The findings

of this project clearly suggested the increasing cultural and ideological cleavage which characterized Iranian society under the monarchical regime. The findings were, however, dismissed then as biased; they failed consequently to be heeded. Under the circumstances, also, the results could not be published at that time.

The national survey included two distinctly different studies on the communication development needs and expectations of the elite and the mass. While the elite study confined itself to a survey of the attitudes of the communication elite, broadcasters and university students, the national survey of social attitudes was based on a sample of some 5,000 all across the country. (See Tehranian, 1977; Assadi & Vidale, 1977). The elite study was based on interviews followed by a questionnaire; the national survey used only a questionnaire completed by trained field staff on the basis of conducted interviews.

Here we shall only give review findings of the elite study, referring those interested in the national survey to Assadi & Vidale (1977). The methodology chosen for the elite study was a modified Delphi technique. In contrast to the Delphi technique, however, no attempt was made in this method to reach a consensus among 'the experts'.

In the first round of interviews, conducted openly in order to seek out the interviewee's definition of the problem, three lines of questions were generally pursued: (a) what were the interviewee's perceptions of the national expectations/needs that broadcasting could fulfill; (b) what were the interviewee's perceptions of the present constraints and future possibilities that impeded the fulfillment of the expectations/needs; and (c) what strategies/policies the interviewee suggested for NIRT in order to bridge the gap between expectations/needs and resources/constraints.

Since the two hundred or so people who were chosen to be interviewed in the first round represented the widest possible range of opinions among the Iranian socio-cultural elite, the interviews produced a vast spectrum of views that lends itself to a variety of dif-

ferent possible interpretations. In the second round of Soroush, therefore, the questionnaire was so designed as to provide data on three sets of problems; (a) behavioral orientations with respect to all media (radio, television, books, cinema, the press, oral channels); (b) affective orientations with respect to the major national development and communications expectations/needs and constraints/possibilities; and (c) cognitive orientations with respect to the major national development and communications strategies/policies. The questionnaire could, thus, produce a mass of data on the basis of which one could test a whole variety of hypotheses on the positions that different age, sex, professional ideological, or interest groups might take on the future role of broadcasting in Iran. The questionnaire was then sent to some 500 members in each of the following three groups: (a) the Iranian communications elite; (b) the NIRT staff, and (c) university students in Iran. The views of the three groups were considered strategically important for the future role of broadcasting.

The assumption behind this methodology of research was that the future is built as a result of interactions between people and socio-economic and technological possibilities. Once we gain a deeper understanding of the directions of change, we may define with a greater measure of confidence our feasible region of action, as shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1



The main objective of the first round of interviews was to assess the views of a selected panel of members of the Iranian communications elite on the future role of broadcasting in Iran. Given the limited period of one to two months available for this round, the panel was necessarily limited. Furthermore, the sample group had to be representative of the wider group. Since the fundamental issue at stake was the role of broadcasting, it was decided to select the group from the following four categories: communications policy-makers, communications policy planners, communications professionals and some critical segments of the audience.

Table 2.1 shows the breakdown of numbers in each category, the total number of those who were invited to be interviewed, and those who were finally interviewed. The large discrepancy between those invited (N=223) and those interviewed (N=89) is due to a number of contributing factors: (a) some members of the panel were not reached because of travel, illness, or other factors, (b) some responded negatively to the request for an interview primarily for political reasons; and (c) in a few instances, repeated delays in appointments exceeded the limit of the project's deadlines.

The categories chosen call perhaps for some explanation. Communications policy-makers include all those ministers and organization directors who, in one way or the other, set the guidelines and parameters, ranging from the Prime Minister to Ministers of Art and Culture, Information and Tourism, PTT, as well as the Director-General of NIRT, etc. Policy Planners included the Deputy Ministers, Deputy-Directors, and senior civil servants who are involved under communications professionals are self-explanatory, but the special position of the last three calls for explanation. University professors in Iran constituted a vocal group of opinion leaders; although their social status had considerably declined in the last 20 years, they were increasingly using the media to make their influence felt. As the events of 1978-79 in Iran showed, the Islamic Ulema also constituted a very influential segment of the opinion leadership; their influence, however, was primarily felt among the traditional social groups. Although they were on the

Table 2.1 Interview Round One: Professional Distribution of the Selected Members of the Iranian Communications Elite

	Invited	Interviewed	Total Interviewed
Communications policy-Makers	23	10	10
Communications policy-Planners	33	11	11
Communications Professionals			
Broadcasters	14	7	
Journalists	16	10	
Publishers	6	4	
University Professors	36	9	
Islamic Ulama	19	7	
Performing Artists	16	2	
Subtotal			39
Critical Segments of the Audience			
University Students	25	17	
Women Leaders	7	3	
Industrial Managers	23	5	
Industrial Workers	4	4	
Subtotal			29
T O T A L	223		89

defensive after the religious riots of June 1963, the government and the media had to take note of their views. Performing artists included all those creators in the broadcasting arts (theatre, music, variety shows, cinema, etc.) whose views are important to the programme content of the media. Four other social groups -youth, women, industrial managers and industrial workers- whose special position in Iranian society could provide us with different outlooks on the future role of broadcasting were also included in the panel.

The questions during the first and second rounds of 'Delphi' focused on a number of policy issues, shown in Figure 2 along a series of continua which demonstrate the two possible policy polarities in each case. The two polar positions, however, need not be mutually exclusive. In fact, some broadcasting systems may combine elements of opposite policies. For instance, the public system in Japan tends to be instructive-directive in its cultural policy, while the commercial system tends to be permissive. (For further elucidation of these policy continua, see Tehranian, 1975).

In the second round of 'Delphi', an extensive questionnaire was forwarded to three groups whose views were considered of critical importance for the future of Iranian communications policy: the general communications elite (as defined in the first round), members of NIRT, and a selected number of Iranian university students - about five hundred in each group.

The findings of this survey among the three previously-considered secular and secularising social groups of Iranian society (namely, the communication elite, the professional broadcasters, and the university students) revealed strong religious sentiments. More than 60 % of the students and 30 % of the elite and broadcasters, responding to a list of twelve ideological orientations, expressed a preference for a <u>fundamentalist Islamic</u> position. The response was all the more remarkable because of the categorical nature of the expressed ideological position and the then prevailing repressive political attitudes towards religion: "All individual and social problems can be resolved with the

Figure 2. Communications Policy Continua: Hypothetical Polarities



Economic Policy	← Monopoly — Competition → ← Private Ownership — Public Ownership →
Organization Policy	← Functional — Modular → ← Central — Regional →
Educational Policy	← Formal — Informal → ← Direct Intervention — Indirect Intervention →
Technological Policy	← Labour-intensive — Capital intensive → ← One-way — Interactive →
Development Support Policy	← Intensive — Extensive →
Research & Development	← Applied — Basic →
Financial Policy	← Commercial — non-Commercial →

help of the Divine Law of Islam. If everyone were to abide by it, human laws would become unnecessary". Furthermore, the highest preferences, were accorded to an egalitarian position close to the spirit of Islam: "In order to become a developed society we should strive to achieve a fairer distribution of wealth and of income and abolish present social and economic inequities". Between 82-85 % of all three groups had identified with this position. Islamic modernism gained the support of 82 % of the elite and the students, and 77 % of the broadcasters: "The mystical and legal traditions of Islam should be preserved. However, it is the duty of all Muslims and particularly of the Ulema to maintain harmony between religious precepts and modern spiritual and material needs. In this way Iran will play an ever-increasing role throughout the entire Islamic world". Sufism (Islamic mysticism) trailed behind Islamic modernism with a 67-68 % support among the elite and broadcasters and a 79 % support among the students. The Sufi position with its non-doctrinaire emphasis upon purity of intentions held that "Islam's teachings enlighten us on the true goals of life, but piety alone cannot solve our problems. To be successful in the search for truth we should embrace the mystical insights of the Holy Koran and the traditions of the Prophet and his rightful successors".

Nationalism in four of its varieties in Iran was the second most important set of ideological tendencies to follow the strong Islamic preferences among all three groups. It was, however, the secular and liberal varieties (represented by the National Front) which elicited the highest support. Secular nationalism found the greatest favor among the broadcasters (86 %), followed by the elite (81 %) and the students (78 %); "We have at our disposal all the essential material and human resources required for rapid development, as the past few decades have amply demonstrated. But to join the ranks of the fully developed countries we ought to keep separate the religious and political spheres. We may have to do away with some of our older traditions and accept social and economic reforms". By contrast, liberal nationalism was slightly less favoured among the elite (78 %), broadcasters (77 %) and the students (69 %): "Western achievements depend on a free market economy and on a democratic political system. To reach the same level of

development of democratic political institutions (political parties, parliament, press, etc.) so as to increase the degree of participation". It would have been interesting, however, to separate the two elements of the above questions to observe their respective popularity.

Pre-Islamic and technocratic orientations in nationalism, as represented by the dominant ideological tendencies of the monarchical regime, was significantly less favored. The pre-Islamic orientation, pristine nationalism, found 74 % of the students, 72 % of the broadcasters, and 64 % of the elite in its favor: "In order to promote the development of Iran we ought to be inspired by our culture and revive the greatness of Iran's pre-Islamic past. We ought to keep our culture free of foreign influences (including Arab) and rely primarily on our Aryan heritage". By contrast, the technocratic orientations in nationalism registered lower esteem equally among all three groups with a 55 % rate of support: "The West's success stems from scientific and technological innovations. In order to achieve the same level of development we should accelerate our scientific and technological progress. Only through science and technology and not through political ideologies are we going to solve our problems".

The ideologies of alienation, including nihilism, opportunism, and cynicism, each registered a low support among all three responding groups with a 14-20 % level of support. One striking exception, however, was the students' 46 % level of support for the opportunist position: "A man is wise if he cannot be misled and knows how to snatch any opportunity that comes his way". Either the youth may be considered more intellectually honest or their perception of the adult world was pessimistic. Fatalism, also, scored relatively high among all three groups (57-63 %): "Individual values are no longer relevant. Today's society imposes its own value system and we have no alternative but to accept it".

This ideological portrait of an important sector of Iranian society and opinion leadership, taken at a moment of material triumph,

is revealing. It shows how strong the religious and egalitarian tendencies were combined with nationalistic preferences and how relativerly weaker stood the ideological positions espoused by the government. But the portrait should not conceal the fact that each respondent had the opportunity of choosing a number of contradictory ideological positions. Thus, Islamic as well as secular and pristine (pre-Islamic) nationalist positions both scored relatively high. The combination of these positions may seem intellectually incompatible, but many respondents appear to have accepted them as emotionally valid and viable. The mosaic of cultural and historical forces which have shaped the modern Persian mind are represented in this portrait, revealing the ideological zones of national concensus as well as the cultural cleavages and the psychological dualisms and schizophrenia prevailing at the time of the study. Since the three groups of respondents represented also three different generations, social strata, and levels of political access, the differences as well as the similarities were all the more significant. The underlying reality of this composite ideological portrait was the fact of an increasing social, economic, and cultural cleavage which cut across age, social status or politics. (For a view of the composite results, see Table 2.2).

Communication Development/Resources/Constraints

Every communication system is subject to a number of environmental parameters which define the limits and possibilities of its action. Among these, geographic barriers, the cultural heritage, the composition and growth of population, economic growth, legal and political norms, social mobility and cultural trade, may be considered as the most important.

Table 2.2 Ideological orientations (Percentage of individuals by category who agree with stated ideological position) in order of their strength of support

Ideological Position	Communication Elite	Professional Broadcasters	University Students	Average of three groups
Egalitarianism	83	82	85	83.3
Moderate Nationalism	81	86	78	81.6
Islamic modernism	82	77	82	80.3
Liberal nationalism	78	77	69	74.6
Islamic mysticism	68	67	79	71.3
Fatalism	58	57	63	59.3
Technocratic nationalism	55	55	55	55
Pristine nationalism	64	72	74	48.6
Islamic fundamentalism	30	30	62	40.6
Opportunism	13	17	46	25.3
Nihilism	18	14	16	16
Cynicism	16	10	19	15

Source: Majid Tehranian et al, Communications Policy for National Development (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul 1977), p. 275

Geographic Conditions

The size, the borders, the major physical barriers (mountains, deserts, water), the major natural communication facilities (waterways and land routes), the climate, and the patterns of human settlement are the major geographic conditions that may be considered. As one reference source has outlined: (Iran Year Book, 1977)

> "Iran covers an area of 628,000 sq. miles (1,648,000 sq. kms). The distance from north to south is about 875 miles: from extreme northeast to southwest about 830 miles. The total length of the frontiers measure about 2,750 miles, about half of which are seacoast.
>
> The country is bounded by the USSR and the Caspian Sea on the north; by Turkey and Iraq in the west; by the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman in the southwest and south; and Pakistan and Afghanistan in the East. Iranian territory also includes a number of islands in the Persian Gulf, of which the most important (because of size, location or the activity which takes place there) are Hormoz, Larak, Queshm, Lavan, Abu Musa, the two Tombs, Kharg, Kish, Sirri, and Farsi.
>
> Iran has been described as a tableland ringed by mountains. The two major mountain ranges are the Zagros and the Alborz, which extend outwards, south and east in a "V" shape whose apex is in northwest Iran at the Turkish border. The Zagros run from this point in a south easterly direction to Baluchistan. The highest peak is Mt. Sabalan (about 15,000 feet). The Alborz extend eastwards along the Caspian coast. The highest peak is Mt. Damavand (18,000 feet). Scattered highland massifs rise to the east. Narrow lowlands border the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea. The central plateau is composed of a chain of basins.
>
> The Zagros are composed of numerous parallel ranges, stretching about 875 miles in length from Azarbaijan to northeast of Bandar Abbas. The ranges are of moderate elevation in the north, tightly packed and high in the central section and spread out again in southern Fars and Lorestan. In places, the Zagros are up to 200 miles wide.
>
> Spring issue from the mountains and winter snows feed rivers and streams. The major rivers are the Karkheh, which rises in Kurdistan and flows into the Tigris; the Karun, which rises in the Bakhtiari mountains, joins the Dez below Shustar, and flows into the Shatt al-Arab. Vegetation occurs in the valleys. Tribes like the Bakhtiari and the Quashqa'i migrate seasonally between upland and lowland.

Many of the major towns and cities of the country, including Tehran, Qom, Qazvin, Isfahan are located on the central plateau, fed by the rivers and seasonal streams. These settlements have often been likened to oasis. The two great deserts, the Dasht-e Kavir and the Dasht-e Lut, occupy the eastern and southeastern parts of the plateau. The deserts are largely uninhabitable wastes. Human settlement has tended to occur in a ring along the southern and western edges of the Kavir.

Climate tends to be extremely varied. Azarbaijan, probably the coldest province, has harsh winters, and heavy snowfalls. The Caspian coast enjoys heavy rainfall and sub-tropical climate. The south is hot and dry, with very low precipitation. The east, though displaying extremes of temperature, is arid. On the plateau, the seasons are regular and clearly marked. Rainfall ranges from a maximum of 50-60 inches in the Caspian littoral to 100 inches on the northern slopes of Alborz, 10 inches in Khuzestan and 2.9 inches in Sistan".

These geographic conditions in Iran present some perennial forces of nature that communication policy makers and planners must take into account. First, the country's vastness of territory (equal to the size of the whole of Western Europe or one-fifth of the United States) and ruggedness of natural barriers (three mountain ranges and two great deserts) have always presented and will continue to present challenges to the effective penetration of a national communication system. Secondly, however, the fairly well-defined borders of the country within the Iranian plateau have provided it with parameters that have withstood the test of times. Many invasions as well as harsh and turbulent times in a long history have been successfully repulsed to maintain and indeed deepen a sense of geographic integrity and cultural identity unique in the world for its longevity and persistance. Third, the political and communication system that has historically emerged out of these two facts may be described as a multi-national bureaucratic (sometimes imperial) system of authority that depended for its survival on a common cultural heritage (Persian as the lingua franca and Shi'a Islam as the faith of more than 90 % of the population) as well as relative tolerance for the ethnic and religious minorities.

Cultural Heritage

Communication may be viewed fundamentally as the process of decoding of a coding system we know as culture. But culture is deeply embedded in language and historical memories. For this reason, the length, depth and periodization of historical memories are important to an understanding of the cultural symbols and imageries that make communication within a given tradition possible. Cultural indicators that could reveal the unity and variety of languages, the extent and depth of written and oral literature in each, as well as the forms and frequency of public communication, are also relevant. Further information on the number and variety of historical monuments (temples, churches, mosques, palaces, public buildings, etc.), the length, depth and variety of musical traditions, the volume and composition of visual arts and handicrafts would provide also cultural indicators that are deeply relevant to an understanding of the homogeneity/heterogeneity of the non-verbal modes of communication.

Iran possesses a rich diversity of these historical memories and cultural traditions. Most standard books on Iran provide some accounts and data, but there exist some very important data gaps. Here we shall confine ourselves only to commenting on the most salient features. First, Iran's historical memories go back at least to some 2,500 years of recorded history. However, the clear breaks in the continuity of its religious traditions which occurred with the Arab invasion of the seventeenth century and the rise of secular nationalism in the twentieth century, have created a cultural schizophrenia centered on the two conflicting Islamic/religious and secular/nationalist identities (Tehranian, 1979b). Second, the predominance of Persian as a lingua franca for most parts of the Islamic period of Iranian history and its adoption as a national language in the modern period, has suppressed the development of the minority languages spoken by about half of the population. This had led to insistent and increasing demands in recent decades on the part of Iran's ethnic minorities for greater cultural and linguistic autonomy. Third, there are strong continuities in the pre-Islamic and post-Islamic identities of Iran as reflected in the development of Iranian art and architecture, musical traditions and

production of handicrafts.

Population Indicators

There have been now three population censuses held in Iran at ten year intervals (1956, 1966 and 1976). Population growth projections have been also made up to 1993. (See Tables 2.3 and 2.4). Both tables reveal a high rate of growth, currently at about 2.7 % per annum, that has resulted in a relatively youthful population. The median age of the population has declined from 20.2 in 1956, to 17.2 in 1966 and 16.9 in 1975 (PBO, 1978; p. 27). Table 2.5 shows, that the dependency ratio (i.e. the ratio between population counted in and out of the labor force) has increased in the last two decades. These facts have important implications for the increasing burden of living and educational costs of the non-active population, problems of generation and cultural gaps, and the orientation towards youth that a realistic communication policy should take.

The spatial distribution of population is of importance to the design of appropriate transmission and production facilities as well as in programming, both for technical as well as cultural reasons. Three different kinds of indicators may be employed to provide a view of the spatial distribution of the population and its changing patterns, i.e. land/man ratios, population density by provinces, and urban/rural distribution of population. Table 2.6 shows the urban/rural distribution of population and its projections up to 1992. This reveals a high rate of urbanization; net urban population growth for the decade of 1956-66 was about 5.1 % per annum. (PBO 1978a, p. 37). However, most of this population has been concentrated in a few large cities; in 1966, for instance, 94.8 % of the cities contained only 42.1 per cent of the total urban population. (PBO 1978a, pp. 38 and 41).

The relative distribution of population among Iran's 14 provinces may be viewed from tables 2.7 and 2.8. Table 2.7 shows the relative

distribution of population among the provinces, but since provinces differ enormously in size, Table 2.8 provides the relative population density in each. Both tables provide time series and thus give indications of the changing patterns of population distribution among the provinces.

Land/man ratios, known also as the biological density of population, reveal the relative availability of agricultural land to population and are of greater significance for development than simple population density. Due to an increase of arable land in 1967-1974 period, biological density of population declined from 3.7 to 3.1 persons per hectare of agricultural land.

Of more direct importance to communications, however, are the ethnic, linguistic and religious compositions of the population. Table 2.9 shows the distribution of population by religion; it underlines the fact of Iran's relative homogeneity in religion. Data on the ethnic and linguistic composition of the population are not however as readily available. Table 2.10 provides a credible estimate, but there are enormous difficulties with such tables and estimates. In the Iranian context, linguistic affiliation does not necessarily imply separate nationality or ethnicity. Gilaki and Mazandarini are, for instance, clearly different dialects, but they do not constitute different ethnic groups or nationalities. Armenian and Assyrian groups are religious and linguistic as well as ethnic affiliations. The degree of separate nationality of the other groups has also been a matter of dispute in recent times. Clearly, however, Iranian society is characterized at once by a cultural unity achieved through Islam and the Persian literary tradition, and a cultural diversity manifested by the presence of a myriad of ethnic groups and nationalities. The concentration of ethnic minorities on the borders of Iran and their spread into the bordering countries, as well as the tribal social structure of some of the minorities and their demands for cultural and national autonomy, however, created political tensions in an age of nationalism.

Table 2.3 Population Indicators: Census Results

	1956	1966	1976
Total Population (Millions)	19.1	26.1	33.591
Growth Rate (%)		2.85	2.95
Vital Statistics (per thousand)			
Crude Birth Rate	48.50	46.48	42.7**
Crude Death Rate	22.2	17.8	13.4**
Age Structure (%)			
Below 15 years	42.0	46.0	45.2**
15-64 years	54.0	50.0	51.8**
Over 65 years	4.0	4.0	3.0**
Literacy Rate (% of population 7 years & over)			
Total	15.4	29.4	42.1*
Male	22.4	40.1	64.6*
Female	8.0	17.9	35.4*
Share of Urban Population (%)	31.4	38.5	46.7
Economically Active Population (% of population 10 years & over)			
Total	47.5	46.1	42.2**
Male	83.9	77.4	69.1**
Female	9.2	12.6	14.1**

* 1975

** 1977/8

Note: For all Census years, adjusted population estimates have been used. The Crude Birth Rate and Death Rate are also estimates. Data on the Economically Active Population are not strictly comparable because of change in the reference period.

SOURCES: Census Reports: Iran Almanac Book of Facts, 16th edn. 1977.

Table 2.4 Population Projections to 1993 by Age Groups

	Projection I (in 1,000 persons)		Projection II (in 1,000 persons)	
Age Group	Total Population	%	Total Population	%
1972-3	31,045	100.0	31,045	100.0
0-14	14,133	45.4	14,133	45.4
15-29	7,870	25.4	7,870	25.4
30-44	4,630	15.0	4,630	15.0
45-65 & up	4,412	14.2	4,412	14.2
1982-83	41,469	100.0	41,624	100.0
0-14	18,337	44.3	18,655	44.8
15-29	11,388	27.4	11,336	27.3
30-44	6,077	14.6	9,032	14.5
45-65 & up	5,668	13.7	5,601	13.4
1992-3	53,532	100.0	55,865	100.0
0-14	21,698	40.6	24,586	44.1
15-29	15,528	29.0	15,381	27.5
30-44	8,913	16.6	8,750	15.6
45-65 & up	7,393	13.8	7,148	12.8

SOURCE: Plan & Budget Organization

Table 2.5 Population Dependency Ratios in Rural and Urban Areas, 1956-1966-1975

Provinces	1956	1966	1975
Total	0.85	0.99	0.95
Urban Areas	0.78	0.90	0.92
Rural Areas	0.90	1.06	0.97

SOURCE: PBO (1978), p. 33.

Table 2.6 Population Projections to 1992,* Urban and Rural
(in 1,000 persons)

Year	Total population	Urban population	Rural population	Urban %	Rural %
1972-3	31,045	13,268	17,777	42.7	57.3
1977-78	35,921	16,922	18,999	47.1	52.9
1981-82	41,469	21,114	20,355	50.9	49.1
1986-87	47,366	25,591	21,775	54.0	46.0
1991-92	53,532	30,380	23,152	56.8	43.2

* for breakdown of this projection by age group, and an alternative projection see Table 2.4

SOURCE: Iran Statistical Center

Table 2.7 Population Distribution by Provinces, 1956-66-76 (%)

Provinces	1956	1966	1976
Central	14.35	19.85	20.60
Gilan	8.60	6.99	6.42
Mazandaran & Gorgan	8.88	8.17	8.54
Eastern Azarbayjan	11.30	10.35	9.51
Western Azarbayjan	3.80	4.34	4.18
Kermanshahan	7.28	7.24	6.98
Khuzestan & Luristan	10.91	9.67	9.96
Fars	7.04	6.75	6.97
Kerman	4.62	4.42	4.16
Khorasan	9.75	9.96	10.59
Esfahan & Yazd	7.99	7.98	8.12
Kordestan	2.32	2.47	2.93
Sistan & Baluchestan	2.26	1.81	1.96
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00

SOURCE: PBO (1978A), p. 35.

Table 2.8 Population Density in Iranian Provinces, 1956-76

Provinces	1966	1976
Central	54.5	75.6
Gilan	88.0	107.3
Zanjan	21.1	26.5
Mazandaran	39.0	50.3
Eastern Azarbayjan	39.2	50.3
Western Azarbayjan	24.9	32.2
Kermanshahan	33.3	41.39
Khuzestan	26.4	33.7
Fars	11.9	15.2
Kerman	4.4	5.63
Khorasan	8.0	10.4
Esfahan	15.0	20.8
Yazd	4.9	6.3
Sistan & Baluchestan	2.8	3.6
Kordestan	24.8	31.3
Hamedan	44.1	53.9
Bakhtiri-Chahar Mahal	20.3	26.6
Lurestan	24.5	29.5
Eilam	11.7	13.4
Bushehr	9.4	12.5
Hormozgan	5.3	7.0
Kohkoloyeh & Boyer Ahmad	14.3	17.2
Semnan	2.5	5.9
Total	15.6	20.4

SOURCE: PBO (1978A), p. 36.

Table 2.9 Population Distribution by Religion, 1956

(in 1,000 persons)

Religion	National		Urban	Rural
	M & F	%	M & F	M & F
Total	25,079	100	9,794	15,285
Moslems	24,772	98.8	9,534	15,238
Jews	61	0.2	59	2
Zoroastrians	20	0.1	16	3
Armenians	108	0.4	93	15
Assyrians	20	0.1	16	4
Other Christians	21	0.1	19	1
Other religions	77	0.3	57	20

SOURCE: 1956 Census

Table 2.10 Population Distribution by Linguistic Groupings

Language	Percentage
Persian	50.2
Azarbaijani	20.6
Gilani	6.1
Luri-Bakhtiari	5.7
Kurdish	5.6
Mazanderani	4.9
Baluchi	2.3
Arabic	2.0
Turkomeni	1.7
Armenian	0.6
Assyrian	0.4

SOURCE: Zonis, 1971, p. 179.

Economic Growth Indicators

Economic growth indicators could be considered under three different possible headings, as long-term (structural), medium-term (developmental), and short-term (economic activity) indicators. (For definitions and applications, see UNRISD, 1970 and PBO, 1978b). Of all these, the most relevant to communication policy and planning are those indicators that bear on infrastructure, manpower, income and markets. It is not possible here to review the abundant data available; the Plan and Budget Organization's periodic review of The Main Economic Indicators provides an excellent reference. However, some justification for the relevance of some indicators to communication is in order.

Communication systems depend vitally upon the physical infrastructures in transport and power facilities. Indicators such as the extent and variety of roads, railroads, airports, ports and private and public means of transportation are therefore extremely useful. Economic indicators on the composition and distribution of national income (GNP per capita, GINI coefficient, urban-rural income ratios, etc.) also provide necessary data for an understanding of the levels of achievement in economic growth and social justice. Manpower indicators such as the employment structure, women's participation in the labour forces, levels of skill, etc., are useful and relevant. If we view the market essentially as an information system, particularly when monetized, data on the state of the market (consumer and wholesale price indices, stock market prices, rates of interest, etc.) are relevant information for formulating appropriate economic communication policies in the short run.

In the case of Iranian economy as indeed of most Third World economies, the extent of dependency on one export commodity may be revealed by such indicators as the compositions of GNP, government revenues, and foreign exchange earnings. In the seventies, Iran's oil revenues constituted some 40-50 % of its GNP, 70-80 % of government revenues, and 80-90 % of foreign exchange earnings.

Social Mobility Indicators

In so far as social mobility is a concept well steeped in such subtle categories as status and class, indicators would have to be round-about and indirect. Such information may come from data on physical mobility (internal migration), occupational mobility (i.e. horizontal social mobility), and income mobility (i.e. vertical mobility). While the population census reports provide a wealth of data for the analysis of the first two categories, PBO's and Central Bank's time series on consumer household expenditures may provide clues to the third. Empirical evidence on all of these indicators suggests high levels of physical and social mobility in Iran in the last 15 years, paralleled with increasing concentration of wealth and income. (Oshima, 1973; IBRD, 1974; Jain, 1974; Pesaran, 1974, 1976; Mehran, 1975; Banuazizi et al, forthcoming; Sohrabi, 1978). This in part explains the nature of the revolutionary movement in the late seventies and early eighties, which received its social support mainly from the urban poor, socially and psychologically displaced from the rural areas and under increasing pressure from the phenomenon of stagflation hitting the Iranian economy.

Legal and Political Norm Indicators

There has been often a notorious chasm in Iran between legal guarantees of freedoms of the press, assembly and speech, and their de facto curtailments. The historical conditions which have brought about this situation are too complex to go into here, but certain legal and political indicators may be found to suggest the pattern and direction of change. On communication rights, the following indicators seem to be the most pertinent:

- the rights of assembly;
- the rights of speech;
- the rights of forming voluntary associations;

- the rights and duties of trade unions;
- the rights and duties of newspapers, journals and book publishers;
- the rights and duties of broadcasting and broadcasters;
- the rights of access to state and corporate information;
- the rights of privacy;
- the rights and duties of writers and artists (the copyright laws);
- the rights and limits of state censorship of public and private communication (wire-tapping, direct and indirect control of the media).

The information on these legal and often extra-legal matters can be found in a variety of documents, including the Fundamental Laws, the Press and Broadcasting Laws, Copyright Laws and Libel Laws. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, of which Iran is a signatory, also includes a vast number of guarantees which bear on communication rights. However, limitations on communication freedom in practice have often outstripped these legal sanctions.

The following indicators of political repression could to some extent measure these limitations:

- size, composition and prison terms of political prisoners;
- size and frequency of political violence, including assassinations, executions, riots, etc.;
- number, frequency and circulation of underground books and exiled press, clandestine radios, books and circulars (shabnameh);
- number, frequency and circulation of clandestine taped messages;
- number, frequency and membership of secret societies;
- number, frequency and sentences of political trials.

The data for such indicators is difficult but not impossible to collect. Amnesty International and International Society of Jurists (Geneva) collect the data for some countries through their own channels and make them available throught their publications. The international

news agencies provide some information which could over a period of time give a composite picture. And it is entirely possible through informal channels of communication of the political dissidents in any country to receive some data. In the Iranian case, the exiled and clandestine press and radios have provided over the past 25 years a very lively source of information on such matters. The number of such publications and stations, ranging between 30-50 periodicals and 3-6 radio stations, was itself an indicator of severe political repression.

Cultural Trade Indicators

One final set of indicators that may be considered as environmental to the communication system are those of cultural trade in software as well as hardware. Indicators of trade in hardware may include the following:

- imports and exports of communication products, i.e., volume and composition of media, telecommunications, and information storage and retrieval hardware;
- imports and exports of books, films, records, tapes, newspapers, journals, etc., by volume and composition.

There are, however, a whole host of other possible indicators which could measure the degree and kinds of cultural interaction and trade with other nations. The following are among them:

- tourism by states, nationalities and foreign exchange earnings and expenditures;
- news flow by states, regions and sources;
- cultural exchanges by volume and composition (art exhibitions, musical concerts, scientific personnel, etc.);
- translations of literary and scientific literature both from and into the national language, by volume and composition.

The data necessary for these indicators can be collected from the appropriate government ministries and departments in Iran (Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of National Guidance - formerly Ministry of Information and Tourism -, Ministry of Science, Culture and Higher Education, etc.).

System Inputs: Communication Development Goals, Resources and Technologies

Development Goals

The communication system is the channel through which the developmental goals are directly or indirectly transmitted to the general public. In Iran, where development planning has been in operation since the early fifties, these goals are formally states in the development plan. The priority attached to these competing as well as complementary goals and objectives can be, however, better understood in terms of the allocation of real resources to them.

Although development objectives as stated in development plans are a notoriously unreliable source for understanding the real dynamics of development in a country, some content analysis of the stated goals and objectives may provide insights into the main problems and solutions as seen by the planners. Planning documents are often goal-setting as well as legitimizing instruments; they reflect therefore the planners' sensitivities to public demands and fashionable trends. In this sense, therefore, they provide useful communication indicators. The following statement of the objectives of the Fifth Development Plan, for instance, reflects not only the most fashionable trends in international development planning community (to which Iranian planners were extremely sensitive in the last twenty-five years) but also the real bootlenecks and presumed solutions that a high rate of economic growth had created in the mid-seventies.

(i) raise the quality of life for all social groups;

(ii) maintain rapid, balanced and sustained economic growth, together with minimum price increases;

(iii) increase the income of various groups, particularly low-

income groups;

(iv) expand social, economic, political and cultural justice with particular emphasis on the equitable distribution of services among all social groups;

(v) improve the quality and increase the supply of active manpower in order to raise productivity and eliminate development bottlenecks;

(vi) preserve and improve the environment, with particular attention to the quality of life in large cities;

(vii) develop science and technology and promote creativity;

(viii) establish competitiveness in the production and export of goods;

(ix) utilise foreign exchange reserves to the full so as to remedy domestic shortages and check inflationary pressures, and for foreign investment and the creation of sources of national wealth to replace depleting oil resources;

(x) maintain and revive the nation's valuable cultural heritage.

The following concepts recur more than once, either explicitly or implicitly, in the above statement of the plan objectives.

CONCEPT	FREQUENCY	
	Explicit	Implicit
Quality	3 (i, v, vi)	2 (vii, x)
Equity	1 (iv)	4 (i, ii, iii, iv)
Productivity	1 (v)	4 (ii, vii, viii, ix)
Inflation	1 (v)	1 (ii)
Bottlenecks	1 (v)	1 (ix)

Any cursory familiarity with the Iranian mode of development during the seventies would confirm that the above five also happened to be the most important problems of the Iranian economy and society. By the end of the Fifth Plan (March 1978), these problems had assumed such

proportions that the rate of growth had declined from a high of 42 % in 1975 to a virtual standstill in 1978, while inflation soared and a mounting social revolt gathered momentum. (Graham, 1978; Halliday, 1979).

The actual allocation of resources during the Fifth Plan, however, reveals that government priorities were placed primarily in defense, capital-intensive industries, infrastructure, power, government buildings, transport and communications, telecommunication, and such politically sensitive projects as housing. Tables 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 show the distribution of funds before and after the sudden rise in oil revenues in 1973 which quadrupled the foreign exchange earnings available to the government. As Robert Graham puts it, this "was an impatient attempt to concertina the time scale to economic take off. The real change was not one of substance but form; more money to be spent on bigger projects in a shorter time; better imported technology; more foreign exports and a host of marginal items that had seemed a luxury in the old Plan - especially in the military field". (Graham, 1978, p. 80).

Communication Resources

The quality and quantity of labor force in, and the budgetary allocations to, communication activities constitute the two most important human and financial inputs of the communication system. The manpower and budgetary allocations could also be broken up into "current" and "developmental" sectors.

While there is an abundance of data from which to draw the necessary information for such indicators, there are two problems that pose themselves. First, there is no generally accepted definition of the boundaries of the communication system. If we include all of the traditional channels of communication in our definition, as indeed we should in the context of the developing countries, the data gaps are

Table 3.1 Total Fixed Investment 1973-8 (billion dollars)

	Original	Revised	Share of Revised Budget %	Increase on original Budget %
Industry & Mines	8.18	12.53	18.0	53
Agriculture/Natural Resources	2.67	4.58	6.6	72
Transport & Communications	2.79	7.29	10.5	161
Housing	5.96	13.70	19.7	130
Oil & Gas	6.83	11.72	16.8	72
Others	10.41	19.77	28.4	90
TOTAL	36.84	69.59	100.0	

Conversion based on $ 1: Rs 76.50

SOURCES: compiled from Bank Markazi annual report, 1974/5, p. 34, Graham, 1978, p. 81.

Table 3.2 Projected Overall Finances 1973-8 (billion dollars)

A. Receipts		
1.	Oil and gas	98.2
2.	Direct taxes	8.1
3.	Indirect taxes	9.1
4.	Other receipts*	3.7
5.	Foreign loans	2.2
6.	Sale of bonds	0.7
	TOTAL	122.0
B. Payments from General Revenue		
1.	Current expenditures	50.2
	(a) general affairs	(6.7)
	(b) defence	(29.2)
	(c) social affairs	(11.1)
	(d) economic affairs	(3.2)
2.	Fixed capital formation	42.2
3.	Repayment of principal of foreign loans	6.0
4.	Other payments	13.4
5.	Investment abroad	11.0
	TOTAL	122.8

* Includes $ 2 billion revenue from public sector investment in, and loans to, other countries.

SOURCES: Plan and Budget Organization, Revised Plan 1973-78, p. 41.
Graham, 1978, p. 82.

Table 3.3 Fixed Investment from Public Sector Funds (1973-1977)
(billion rials)

Sector	Original	Revised	Increase	Percent
1. Agriculture	121	239.6	118.6	98.0
2. Water	106	160	54	51.0
3. Industry	180	352.1	172.1	95.6
4. Mines	46	62	16	34.8
5. Oil	130	333	203	156.1
6. Gas	24	51	27	112.5
7. Electricity	53	240	187	352.8
8. Communications	177	404	227	128.2
9. Telecommunications	36	91.4	55.4	153.9
10. Rural Development	36	60	24	66.7
11. Urban Development	32	45	13	42.2
12. Government Buildings	91	320	229	251.6
13. Housing	90	230	140	155.6
14. Education	127	130	3	2.4
15. Culture	5	10	5	100.0
16. Tourism	7	11	4	57.1
17. Health	24	43	19	79.2
18. Welfare	5	9	4	80.0
19. Sports	9	15	6	66.7
20. Provincial Development	-	10	10	-
21. Public Affairs	-	32	32	-
TOTAL	1,299	2,848.1*	1,549.6**	119.0

* Includes 65.8 billion rials loans to private sector

** Includes 229 billion rials loans to private sector

SOURCE: Iran Year Book, 1977, p. 201.

enormous. The size of Iran's Muslim clergy has been estimated, for instance, between 10-12,000 (according to one Ayattollah) to some 200,000 (The New York Times) and 400,000 (Le Monde). The problem is again one of definition; since there are in fact no generally accepted or formal standards of membership in the clerical ranks, the estimates could vary so widely. It is possible, however, to define "professional communicators" and conduct census surveys accordingly.

Second, the distinction between "current" and "developmental" is at best an arbitrary one. In so far as some measure of the activities of the scientific staff of the universities is spent on research, their salaries should be considered both current as well as developmental. Nevertheless, since science and technology transfer is a very important part of the developmental process, a distinction in this respect is necessary for identifying those indicators critical to the process.

Manpower planning was undertaken for NIRT by Arthur D. Little Co. and Communications Satellite Planning Center of Stanford University. The ADL and Stanford reports contain twenty-year manpower projections up to 1992, but most of these projections are now of little value due to the postrevolutionary radical changes in manpower policies.

Communication Technologies

Communication technologies could be differentiated on the basis of at least four different criteria, traditional vs. modern, labor intensive vs. capital intensive, one-way vs. interactive, and intensive vs. extensive. These perspectives are complementary; indicators to monitor the change in communication technologies on the basis of these criteria could therefore be interchangeable.

The distinction between traditional and modern communication technologies is in fact an arbitrary one, but it seems useful in the context of the developing countries to consider all of the communication techno-

logies subsequent to the invention of printing as "modern". The size of the modern sector as measured by appropriate indicators such as the size of capital investment, production capacity, control and ownership would suggest the degree of 'modernization' of the communication system. The traditional technologies are in fact embedded in the traditional communication institutions and will be discussed in the following section.

Labor vs. capital intensive technologies in communication cut across the distinction between traditional and modern. In the modern sector, however, this distinction is of increasing importance in the choice of automated vs. manual processes with implications for employment and income distribution.

The distinction between one-way and interactive processes is self-explanatory except in that a combination of one way-media technologies can in fact produce interactive programs; letters to the editors can provide interaction with the broadcasters; tele-conferencing could use several different media to produce further interaction; and so on.

The distinction between communication intensive and extensive technologies is perhaps the most difficult to apply; it refers simply to the degree of audience coverage. A tutorial is perhaps the most intensive form of communication, while satellites provide perhaps the most communication extensive technology.

The bias of technology in communication is an important one to monitor, because modern, capital intensive, one-way, communication-extensive technologies tend to be supported and in turn support centralized systems of political authority. By contrast, the more traditional, labor-intensive, interactive and communication-intensive technologies are more often typical of the more democratic processes of communication. While these propositions should not be taken in a literal sense, their validity could be well demonstrated in the consequences of the communication policies of the Iranian government in the past twenty-five years. These policies clearly favored broadcasting to the

detriment of telecommunications (PTT services), automated and centralized press at the expense of small-scale and diversified press, and large, orchestrated public rallies and political parties at the expense of freedom of voluntary associations. The consequences were political alienation and the use of the small media to counter the big media (Tehranian, 1979b).

System Structures: Message Production, Distribution, Reception

The heart of a communication system consists of the social institutions and structures that serve it. For planning purposes, it is useful to view these institutions as communication industries with their own processes of message production, distribution and consumption (reception). Here, we shall review the conditions of different communication industries in the light of indicators on their ownership, control, production and distribution facilities.

The traditional Media

The traditional media in Iran may be divided between those used primarily for religious or secular purposes. The religious communication institutions include the mosque, the shrines, the madrasseh (theological school), Khaneghah (the Sufi house of worship), rowseh khani (gatherings for religious mourning), tafsir Quran (gatherings for the interpretation of the Holy Book), Hosseinieh and Fatemieh (meeting halls for religious sermons and activities), Takyeh (annual tents put up for large religious mournings), etc. There are few, if any, accurate statistics on the size, 'ownership', control and the activities of these institutions in Iran. A strong secular policy under the Pahlavi regime discouraged any kind of systematic study of the religious institutions. It is significant that the State Statistical Yearbook lists mosques and shrines simply as ancient and historical monuments, neglecting their current social and cultural functions. It omits all of the other religious institutions.

Historical studies of the Islamic religious institutions abound, both in Persian and Arabic as well as in the Western languages (for brief and authoritative introductions to the above institutions, see The Encyclopedia of Islam). However, few scholars have paid sufficient

attention to these institutions as media of public communications in Islam. As a notable exception, Asghar Fathi (1977; 1979) has plausibly argued that "the pulpit, or minbar, in the mosque in the traditional and transitional Moslem society is an organized system of communication operated by a class of professional communicators. It is assumed that prior to the introduction of the press, radio and motion picture in Moslem societies, a system of public communication existed which performed some of the functions of mass media in modern societies". As the Islamic revolution in Iran has shown, the Minbar together with the use of small media (xeroxing, cassette tapes, telephone) could provide a powerful antidote to the big media controlled by the government (Fathi, 1979; Mowlana, 1979; Tehranian, 1979a).

Traditional secular institutions of public communication in Iran have been often tied to the religious institutions in a variety of ways. The Zur-khaneh (the house of strength) is a sports house for the practice of traditional sports, particularly that of wrestling, while it has served historically as a channel for the continuation of the pre-Islamic, Iranian traditions of chivalry. In the Islamic Era, however, the zur-khaneh became intimately tied to the quasi-religious traditions of futtwat and javanmardi associated with the name of Ali - the Prophet's son-in-law, the fourth Caliph of Islam and the Shi'ites' first Imam. It also served as a communication network for a class of luties, the men of chivalry in the ruban areas, who were closely allied with the Ulema and the Bazaar merchants. (Bahar, 1978). The Bazaar in Iran has also served historically as a center of urban commercial life and an effective communication and political network relatively independent of the central government. Together with the radical Ulama and the intelligentsia, it provided the leadership for the Constitutional as well as the Islamic Republican Revolution.

By contrast, the ghahveh-ghaneh (the Persian coffee house), the dowreh (the Persian custom of rotary gatherings of intimate circles of friends), and the long traditional of secret societies have provided communication networks less visible but no less powerful. In a society which has historically fluctuated between extremes of political

centralization and fragmentation, these networks have maintained a sense of continuity and security, made possible amidst change and turmoil. They have also kept the exchange of news and rumor alive despite considerable control and censorship.

For all of these reasons, and because of a considerable lack of information about these informal and traditional channels of communication, their study should be considered vital to Iranian communication indicators. The most important source for such a study lies in the major Shi'a theological centers in Qum, Mashhad, and Najaf (Iraq). Shazman-e Owghaf (the Endowment Organization), the government organization which until the Islamic Revolution (February 1979) was primarily responsible for religious affairs, may also be considered as another important source. Table 4.1 provides some data on the number of mosques and shrines from that source.

The Theatre

Theatre is one of the few traditional media of communication in Iran which has merged into its modern forms. Indicators of growth of theatre would have therefore to take account of many different types that have emerged. Communication in theatre indicators may include data on the number of halls, seats, spectators and types of plays (traditional, Western, modern Iranian, tele-theatre), types of financing, etc. Table 4.2 provides data only on the number of halls, seatings and spectators. Ministry of Art and Culture provides the major sources of information on theatre in Iran.

Traditional Persian theatre includes the following genres:

- Ta'azieh, the Shi'a religious passion play;
- Rou-howzie, the popular burlesque show;
- Naghalli, the story-telling narrative in coffee houses.

Table 4.1 Religious Centers in Iran by Province, 1976

PROVINCE	MOSQUES	SHRINES
TOTAL	5035	1259
Central	1263	274
North	322	194
Fars	366	210
Khorasan	426	126
Khuzistan	150	59
Kerman	216	71
Esfahan	264	79
West	167	38
E. Azarbayejan	866	31
W. Azarbayejan	419	49
Qazvin	114	19
Hamadan	64	33
Yazd	131	16
Boroujerd	14	5

SOURCE: Office of the Religious Corps, the State Endowment Organization.

Table 4.2 Theatre: Halls, Seats & Spectators, 1972-3

City	1972 Hall	1972 Seating	1972 Spectators	1973 Hall	1973 Seating	1973 Spectators
TOTAL	13	4806	374,000	14	5450	320,430
Tehran	7	2432	29,000	8	3030	21,420
Mashad	1	260	11,000	1	260	14,000
Rezaiyeh	1	160	2,000	1	160	10,000
Sanandaj	1	350	25,000	1	250	15,000
Esfahan	3	1000	293,000	3	1000	250,000

1974: Spectators - Tehran 47,935
Provinces 13,170

SOURCE: Report of the Committee on Information and Social Communication, the Sixth Development Plan, Tehran, 1976.

Modern theatre could be divided into the following genres:

- Lalezari theatre, the modern popular musical theatre;
- Classical Western, translations of classical Western plays;
- Modern Western, translations of modern Western plays;
- Classical Persian, plays based on classical Persian literature;
- Modern Persian, plays by modern Persian authors;
- Experimental, experimental plays mostly at University theatres;
- Tele-theatre, plays especially written for television.

For a review of some of these genres and further data on theatre in Iran, see The Report of the Committee on Information & Communication, the Sixth Development Plan, Tehran, 1976.

The Press

The Iranian press has a long and distinguished history intertwined with the history of the country's struggle for democracy and national independence. For this reason if no other, information on the development of journalism and data on the conditions of the press is more readily available. The Ministry of Information and Tourism, renamed subsequent to the February Revolution, as the Ministry of National Guidance, has had the over-all responsibility for the press. In June 1979, the Ministry introduced a new press bill that was approved by the Revolutionary Council on 11 August 1979 (for the text, see Appendix). (Whitley, 1979).

The fortunes of the press have followed the political fortunes of the country rather closely. Since the Constitutional Revolution of 1906-09, the country has alternated between four periods of political centralization and political fragmentation. So has the press. Discarding for the moment the less significant political flutters within each period, we may identify these four periods as follows:

- 1906-1925, parliamentary democracy & political fragmentation;

- 1925-1941, monarchical dictatorship & political centralization;
- 1941-1953, parliamentary democracy & political fragmentation;
- 1953-1979, monarchical dictatorship & political fragmentation;

The Islamic Republican Revolution of February 1979 seems to have inaugurated the return of the centrifugal forces of democracy. The press has also followed suit with a dramatic rise in the number, variety and circulation of newspapers and periodicals. We may divide the press into the following categories:

- Large circulation daily newspapers
- Medium circulation daily newspapers
- Other newspapers of general interest
- Journals of general interest
- Journals of literary and scientific interest
- the Press in exile
- the Provincial press

Appropriate indicators for monitoring changes in the conditions of the press may include the following: ownership, control, number and types in each of the above categories and possible sub-categories, length and frequency of publication, circulation (units of print and units of readership), sources of finance, languages of publication, places of publication, contents by subject and source, staff by size and education, etc.

Since the conditions of the press have dramatically changed after the February Revolution and still continue to take new turns, the available data on the pre-revolutionary period would not shed much light on the present situation. (For such data, see Jahandary, 1977). Here we shall confine ourselves only to a few suggestive and comparative indicators. Whereas the highest circulation for the largest daily in Tehran (Kayhan) was recorded at 300,000 in 1978, the circulation of Tehran's two major evening dailies (Kayhan and Ettela'at) are reported to have surpassed 1½ million in the early months of the revolution, while the morning newspaper Ayandegan is reported to have hovered

around 400,000. (Whitley, 1979). While the number of periodicals actually declined from 207 in 1964 to 104 in 1975, (see Table 4.3), the post-revolutionary Iran has witnessed a resurgance of journalistic activities. More than 100 newspapers and periodicals initiated or renewed publication in Tehran alone in the post-revolutionary months. However, the numbers and circulations of the press sharply dropped as the dominant clerical groups and parties closed down the party headquarters and newspapers with liberal or leftist orientations. At present (mid-1980), circulation of the following major newspapers published in Tehran are as follows:

Name	Frequency of Publication	Ownership and Control	Circulation (App.)
Keyhan	Daily evening	Mustazaffan Foundation (Government)	300,000
Ettela'at	Daily evening	Mustazaffan Foundation (Government)	150,000
Azadegan	Daily morning	Government (?)	40,000
Enghelab Islami	Daily evening	President A.H. Banisadr	?
Jomhuriy-e Islami	Daily morning	Islamic Republican Party	?
Tehran Times (English)	Daily morning	Private (?)	?

Other party or independent newspapers, such as Mardom (Tudeh Party), Mujahed (Mujahedeen Khalgh Party), Ayandegan and Bamdad (independent), Kar (Fadaiyan Khalgh Party) and Junbesh (Junbesh Group) have been either closed down or have gone underground. An effervescent exiled press (in Persian, English and French) has also once again reappeared along with exile radio stations in Iraq, Cairo and Baku. Some publishing houses and bookshops have also come under attack by zealous revolutionary groups.

Printing and Publishing

The printing and publishing industries in Iran have also shown the same general trends as the press. They achieved great progress in technological transfers and financial organization during the sixties and seventies, while failing under the conditions of censorship to improve their quality and sales in commensurate terms. The number of books published annually stood at about 330 from 1941 to 1949 when publication rose to about 505 books. In 1955, this number increased to 707 and then to 803 in 1962. The year 1970 saw the greatest number of books published with some 4,359 titles, but this trend immediately reversed itself and the numbers declined to about 3,000 per year in the seventies... (See Tables 4.6 and 4.7). The decline was all the more alarming because of the growth of all the other indicators of socio-economic development. The population of the country was growing steadily at nearly 3 %; literacy increased at an even faster pace (8.2 % between 1966 and 1975); the number of students of institutions of higher learning had increased from about 30,000 in 1966 to about 190,000 by 1979; and GNP per capita had risen by leaps and bounds from around $ 450 in 1971 to $ 2,400 in 1978. On the other hand, of the 213 universities and institutions of higher learning with 218 libraries, 41 or 19 % of the total, had absolutely no library facilities. Thus, some 5,000 students had no access to libraries in their colleges. While 5 % of the state education budget was devoted to sports and scouting, no such stipulation was made for books and libraries. In the meantime, the drop in the number of books published was paralleled by flagging circulation; the average circulation of a book other than textbooks stood between 1,000 to 3,000 copies. The total number of books other than textbooks, published since the introduction of modern printing in Iran until March 1976, is estimated at around 50,000 copies, of which about 40,000 were printed in the years between 1942-75. (Iran Almanac, 1977).

The situation was entirely different for textbooks, however. It was announced in January 1977 that some 70 million text-books in 662 titles will be prepared and distributed throughout the country in the

Table 4.3 Iranian Newspapers and Periodicals by Type, 1964-1975

Year	Newspapers					Magazines	
	Total	Daily	Afternoon	Air	Weekly	Weekly	Monthly/ Seasonal
1964	207	20	5	2	89	39	52
1965	207	20	5	2	89	39	52
1966	207	20	5	2	89	39	52
1967	188	27	5	2	82	31	41
1968	188	27	5	2	82	31	41
1969	188	27	5	2	82	31	41
1970	181	27	5	4	71	26	48
1971	185	25	5	4	71	30	54
1972	193	30	5	4	68	32	54
1973	195	30	5	4	68	31	57
1974	131	21	3	3	54	19	30
1975	104	20	3	3	11	38	30

SOURCE: State Statistical Yearbook, 1977, p. 176.

Table 4.4 Iranian Periodicals by Language, 1967-1975

Year	Total	Persian	English	French	Arabic	Armenian	German	Assyrian
1967	188	180	3	1	1	1	1	1
1968	188	180	3	1	1	1	1	1
1969	188	180	3	1	1	1	1	1
1970	181	171	5	1	1	1	1	1
1971	185	174	6	1	1	1	1	1
1972	190	177	8	1	1	1	1	1
1973	194	182	7	1	1	1	1	1
1974	131	122	3	1	2	1	1	1
1975	104	95	3	1	2	1	1	1

SOURCE: State Statistical Year Book, 1977, p. 177.

Table 4.5 Iranian Periodicals by type & Province, 1976

PROVINCE	TOTAL	Periodicals (Type)			
		Newspaper	Weekly	Monthly/Seasonal	Yearly
TOTAL	316	19	44	135	18
Central-Tehran	196	13	31	134	18
Qom	3	0	2	1	0
Khorasan	2	2	0	0	0
Esfahan	2	1	1	0	0
E. Azarbayejan	1	1	1	0	0
Fars	2	0	2	0	0
Mazandaran	1	0	1	0	0
Gilan	2	1	1	0	0
W. Azarbayejan	1	0	1	0	0
Kerman	1	1	0	0	0
Sistan & Baluchestan	1	0	1	0	0
Kurdestan	1	0	1	0	0
Hamadan	1	0	1	0	0
Yazd	2	0	2	0	0

SOURCE: State Statistical Yearbook, 1977, p. 177.

Table 4.6 Books Published in Iran (for the first time)

Year	Literary Subjects	Religious Subjects	Others	Total
1963-64	217	45	260	522
1970-71	587	295	704	1,586
1976-77 (est.)	580	300	700	1,580

SOURCES: Central Library, Unesco; Tehran Press.

Table 4.7 Books Published in Iran (printed and reprinted)

Year	Number	Year	Number
1941-42	328	1971-72	3,474
1961-62	587	1973-74	3,070
1962-63	803	1974-75	2,899
1964-65	1,048	1975-76 (est.)	3,100
1970-71	4,359	1976-77 (est.)	3,200

SOURCES: Central Library, Unesco; Tehran Press.

next school year (1977-78). And it was estimated that about 100 million textbooks will be printed for 1978-79. (See Table 4.8). No accurate statistics exist on booksellers in Iran, of whom there seem to be 300 in Tehran alone. Only 100 of them are, however, members of the Publishers' Association. There are, by contrast, 1,200 textbook sellers in Iran who receive a commission. (Iran Almanac, 1977). Table 4.9 projects textbook publication plans to 1983 and reflects an expected phenomenal increase in demand.

A cursory look at the subject composition of books published in Iran reveals some extraordinary facts and trends. Table 4.6 has already shown that if we divide published books into three general categories of literary, religious and other subjects, religious books have constituted a significant portion. What is, however, more important to note is the fact that the rate of growth in the publication of religious books has by far outpaced the other two categories.

Table 4.10 shows books published by a further breakdown of subjects and reveals that the religious trends were strengthened throughout the sixties and seventies; religious books overtook literary books in popularity by the early seventies. If we consider the reprinted titles and the volume of sales, statistics which are less readily available, the religious trends would appear even more striking. A comparison with some other countries also reveals the striking popularity of religious subjects in Iran. (See Table 4.11). The position of social science books also improved considerably within the same period. These facts suggest how strong policies were counterbalanced by increasing politization and religiosity as reflected in the popularity of books on religion and social sciences.

Further international comparisons (see Table 4.12 and Figure 4.1) reveal that judged by its capita income, Iran lags far behind other countries in its publishing industry. As the situation in post-revolutionary Iran has shown, however, the potential for the industry is great. According to the Iranian Publishers' Association, more than two million volumes have been published in the country within the first

Table 4.8 Textbook Circulation in Iran, 1966-1978

Year	Primary School	Secondary School
1966-67	10,056,054	5,924,921
1971-72	28,734,630	3,334,630
1976-77 (est.)	40,000,000	10,000,000
1977-78 (est.)	50,000,000	20,000,000

SOURCE: Iran Almanac, 1977.

Table 4.9 Projected Textbook Agreements to 1983 (in million books)

Year	Elem.	Guidance	Secondary	Teacher Guides	Teacher Training	Total
1977	30	25.5	25	1.285	0.6	83.39
1978	31.28	28.18	27.50	1.51	0.66	89.03
1979	32.60	31.14	30.25	1.55	0.73	96.27
1980	33.99	34.41	33.28	1.91	0.80	104.19
1981	35.43	38.02	36.60	1.88	0.88	112.81
1982	36.94	42.01	40.26	2.07	0.97	122.25
1983	39.51	56.42	44.29	2.28	1.06	132.56

SOURCE: Pira, 1977.

Table 4.10 Books Published in Iran by Subject, 1963-76

Year	Total	General Works	Philosophy	Religion	Language	Pure Science	Pract. Science	Art	Literature	History Geography	Social Science
1963	522	11	24	45	24	23	30	12	217	61	65
1964	984	37	53	16	41	53	68	15	421	94	106
1965	1104	46	51	181	56	71	62	18	418	104	97
1966	1242	42	65	126	53	69	99	17	537	111	123
1967	1341	18	59	177	92	60	112	14	535	142	132
1969	1231	42	64	125	52	67	104	17	536	111	113
1970	1536	67	62	295	92	76	99	34	538	112	162
1971	1961	81	60	335	104	124	155	35	691	176	300
1972	2236	85	83	492	84	144	180	60	607	152	394
1973	2316	87	79	516	53	122	254	89	595	213	308
1974	1874	88	48	438	87	59	160	47	388	152	251
1975	2092	69	47	518	34	71	244	50	390	204	307
1976	2891	74	85	665	79	105	408	50	412	318	415

SOURCES: ICDI, 1976; State Statistical Yearbook, 1977.

Table 4.11 Books Published in Selected Countries by Subject, 1970

Country	Total	General Work	Philosophy	Religion	Social Science	Language	Pure Science	Pract. Science	Art	Literature	History & Geography
Afghanistan(1)	100	-	3.6	9.6	36.2	1.2	3.6	10.8	13.3	12.1	9.6
East Germany	100	4.2	1.9	6.6	20.8	5.3	8.2	17.9	7.2	21.7	6.2
Egypt(1)	100	4.2	2.7	15.7	23.1	7.7	7.2	9.8	3.0	20.5	6.1
England	100	1.8	3.0	4.0	18.0	1.6	10.0	14.8	8.0	27.1	11.7
France	100	2.4	3.3	4.9	24.3	2.2	5.9	13.7	6.2	27.7	9.4
India	100	1.8	2.9	6.7	33.9	1.5	4.5	6.8	1.6	32.0	8.3
Iran	100	4.2	3.9	18.7	10.2	5.6	4.8	6.3	2.3	37.1	7.0
Iraq	100	2.9	0.6	13.2	31.3	2.5	1.6	4.9	2.1	25.0	15.9
Japan	100	2.7	2.9	1.9	22.7	3.1	6.7	18.3	8.8	24.3	7.8
Turkey	100	7.6	2.0	4.6	32.4	2.1	6.4	17.8	5.3	16.0	5.8
Sweden	100	1.9	1.6	3.5	16.0	5.6	9.4	21.4	3.8	27.1	8.9
U.S.A.	100	2.6	3.8	5.7	23.7	1.4	7.1	12.2	8.1	23.3	12.1
West Germany	100	7.2	2.3	6.2	30.4	4.0	5.6	10.0	5.9	20.2	8.2

(1) 1969

SOURCE: Unesco Statistical Yearbook, 1970.

Table 4.12 Books Published in Selected Countries per Population, 1970

Country	Population (million persons)	Number of titles Published	Titles per one million inhabitants
Afghanistan	16.5	83	5
East Germany	17.3	5,234	303
Egypt	32.5	1,872	58
France	50.8	22,935	453
England	55.7	33,441	600
India	550.4	14,145	26
Iran	29.0	1,586	55
Iraq	9.4	515	55
Japan	103.5	31,249	302
Sweden	8.0	7,709	958
Turkey	35.2	5,854	166
U.S.A.	205.4	79,530	387
West Germany	61.7	45,369	736

SOURCE: National Library

Figure 4.1. Number of books per 1 Million of population in selected countries, 1970



Source: Iran Statistical Center, *Books and Press in Iran*, 1973

six months of 1979, of which 80 % has already sold.

Apart from some of the indicators discussed above, other should be devised therefore to monitor the freedom of the press, the printing and publishing industries, ownership and control, diversity of editorial policies, commensurate with the variety of ethnic, religious and ideological groupings, size and sources of private and public subsidies.

The growth of publishing industry in Iran, particularly in the recent decade, has been also constrained by the underdeveloped status of its infrastructure. Until 1970, Iran imported all its paper requirements, but in that year the country's first paper mill went on production stream. In 1976-77, Iran's paper consumption was estimated at 280,000 tons, while the local production was about 50,000 tons. By the end of the Fifth Plan (March 1978), the total paper consumption in Iran was expected to rise to 300,000 tons, about 100,000 tons of which was to be locally produced. In 1977, the per capita newsprint paper consumption in Iran amounted to 800 gramme (0.80 kgs.) per diem, while the per capita stationary and book paper consumption amounted to 4.0 kgs. per diem. By international standards, therefore, Iran has had one of the lowest per capita consumptions of paper and newsprint. Other indicators to measure the size and capacity of the infra-structure of the publishing industry should include the number and production capacity of printing presses, the number and size of public libraries, the number and production capacity of other ancillary industries (ink, binding, etc.).

The Film Industry

The Film Industry in Iran has gone through three stages. First, the stage of silent cinema which began in Iran at the turn of the century. Second, the stage of sound movies that was inaugurated early in the 1920's. Third, the stage of modern Iranian film industry which began

with the introduction of dubbing at the conclusion of the Second World War.

Modern film industry in Iran has therefore experienced more than three decades of growth and development. The first decade was almost exclusively devoted to the acquisition of the technical skills. The industry entered into a period of commercial development in its second decade. It was only in the third decade, however, that the Iranian film industry came to assume a unique character of its own with productions which are worthy of international attention. (ICDI, 1976; Graham, 1977; Akrami, 1978).

Table 4.13 shows the level of production of films in the course of the last three decades. Production peaked in the early seventies, but it has declined since then. Rising production costs, increasing censorship, the spreading use of television for entertainment, price controls and low investment returns on cinema houses, were perhaps the major factors responsible for this decline. In the meantime, however, government had increasingly entered into the film industry. In 1976, for instance, the office of Film Production of the Ministry of Culture and Art produced 149 color films of 16 and 35 millimeters, totalling 1,854.5 minutes on a whole host of subjects.

In the same year, the Centre for the Intellectual Development of Children and Youth also produced 9 animation and feature 35 ml. films, totalling up to 214 minutes. National Iranian Radio Television had also entered into the field with the establishment of Telefilm, an independent feature film production company. In cooperation with Iranian and foreign producers and directors, Telfilm produced a number of long feature films (e.g. The Cycle by Darius Mahrjouii, The Mongols and Cinderella by Parvis Kimyavi, and a documentary of Iranian history by David Frost) which are worthy of note.

Most films shown in Iran have been, however, of foreign origin. Table 4.14 gives the number of films shown in Iran for the first time in recent years by their country of origin. American and Italian films

lead the list to be followed by Iranian, French, Indian, English and Hong Kong films. Exports of Iranian films also assumed some importance in the seventies (see Table 4.15).

The growth of cinema houses in the country showed a steady progress up to the mid-seventies and a decline thereafter. (See Table 4.16). There has been a heavy concentration of cinemas in Tehran (some 27 %). The number of cities with cinema houses increased from 80 to 140 between 1968 and 1975. Iran could claim about 11 cinema seats per 1,000 population in 1975; this fell however, below the Unesco standard of 20 seats.

As the above picture reveals, the situation of the film industry in Iran has been precarious. Despite some government support particularly in the seventies, the patronage of the Queen, the annual organization of three international film festivals (The Tehran Film Festival, the Childrens' Film Festival, and AUB's Young Film Makers Festival) and some notable international recognition for individual directors (e.g. Mehrjuii and Kimyavi), the film industry has been plagued in Iran by entrenched attitudes on the part of the government as well as the public unfavorable to its growth. Government control and censorship has been a serious handicap for the growth of quality films, while religious opposition to some uses of the medium made cinema houses along with banks and liquor stores, a popular target for attack in the seventies. Apart from these factors, combined with increasing costs and commercialism, competition from television, government price controls, and the poor quality of maintenance in the cinema houses, the cinema has been increasingly reduced to the role of a lower class urban leisure activity catering to popular tastes for sex and violence.

Indicators to monitor the types and frequencies of films shown, the size and types of audiences attending them, and the uses and gratifications derived are important and relevant. (See Akrami, 1978).

Table 4.13 Commercial Films Produced in Iran, 1948-77

Year	Number of films
1948	2
1950	1
1960	25
1970	63
1971	70
1972	100
1973	140
1974	80
1975	60
1976	60
1977	43

SOURCES: Akrami, 1978; Tehranian, 1979c, p. 82.

Table 4.14 Films Shown in Iran by the Country of Origin, 1974-76

YEAR	Iran	America	Italy	France	India	England	Hong Kong
1974	61	143	71	33	27	16	59
1975	70	117	96	27	27	27	13
1976	56	109	89	29	22	21	6

YEAR	Turkey	U.S.S.R.	Japan	Germany	Joint	Histl.	Total
1974	9	6	12	-	10	12	473
1975	12	4	10	11	24	10	448
1976	15	7	3	7	15	17	396

SOURCE: Ministry of Culture and Art, Tehran.

Table 4.15 Exports of Iranian Films, 1974-76

Country	1974	1975	1976
Total	62	128	115
Afghanistan	2	83	93
Dubai	53	42	16
U.S.A.	1	1	2
U.S.S.R.	5	2	1
France	1	0	0
Kuwait	0	0	1
England	0	0	1
Czechoslovakia	0	0	1

SOURCE: State Statistical Yearbook, 1976, p. 166.

Table 4.16 Cinema Houses in Iran, 1954-76

Year	Teheran	Provinces	Total
1954	40	70	110
1973	122	302	424
1974	113	318	431
1975	112	341	453
1976	111	296	407

SOURCE: Ministry of Culture and Art.

Broadcasting

Except for a short period of eleven years during which a commercial television company operated transmitters in Tehran and Abadan, broadcasting has always been a government monopoly in Iran. Under the Islamic revolutionary regime, all indications are that it will continue to be so far the foreseeable future.

The first radio station in Iran was inaugurated on 24 April 1940 by the then Crown Prince who, following the exile of his father Reza Shah, the founder of the Pahlavi dynasty, ascended the throne less than a year later on 25 August 1941 and addressed the nation by radio as the new Shah.

In a country as vast and heterogeneous as Iran, radio was clearly the most effective means for reaching the people and soon became an indispensable instrument for political struggles for power.

Control of broadcasting shifted hands with the changing fortunes of dominant political groups. In its first two years Radio Iran was under the supervision of the Ministry of Post, Telegraph and Telephone. In 1942 it became an independent organization. After undergoing a period of administrative shifts and uncertainty it came under the Directorate General of Publications and Propaganda attached to the Prime Minister's Office. During the political turmoils of the early fifties radio was often used for the political mobilization both by Prime Minister Mosaddeq and later by the succeeding governments. Indeed, the radio station was one of the first targets of attempts for political control. The practical as well as symbolic importance of broadcasting could not be overlooked by politicians of the period (Lerner, 1958; Tehranian, 1972).

In an attempt to rationalize the government's communications policy, a new Ministry of Information was established in 1964 which incorporated the old Department General of Publications and Propaganda and Radio Iran was placed under its supervision.

When television came on the scene and broadcasting activities increased in size and importance, radio broadcasting was transferred in 1971 to the National Iranian Television Organization in order to achieve greater coordination between the two media.

In contrast to radio, which started because of government initiative, television was introduced into Iran in 1958 by a private entrepreneur. From its very inception television took on a commercial American style with Westerns and quiz-shows predominating. The government granted the proprietor a five-year monopoly to operate television transmitters and to import television receivers. Television of Iran (TVI) established transmitters in Tehran (1958) and Abadan (1960). At the expiration of the first five-year term and following some inconclusive negotiations aimed at the government takeover of TVI's operations, the concession was extended, but a separate public television network was established (Banani, 1971). On 20 March 1966 the first transmission station of National Iranian Television (NITV) was inaugurated in Tehran. The new station set a style different from the commercial station appealing primarily to the more educated segments of the population. In June 1969 political considerations finally led to the nationalization of TVI after eleven years of commercial activity. With the incorporation of radio in 1971 and the takeover in 1974 of an educational television channel run by the Ministry of Education, NIRT became a public broadcasting monopoly run as an independent government corporation. Since its establishment in 1966 NIRT has grown rapidly in size and range of activities. Before the February 1979 Revolution, it employed 9,000 people of whom over 4,500 were stationed in Tehran: this number was expected to double by the early 1980's. After the Revolution, however, NIRT has started a program to reduce staff as well as some domestic and foreign centers. Its radio broadcasting facilities include sixty-four AM medium-wave radio transmitters (active and reserve) in thirty-one cities with a total power output of 7,710 kw. The AM radio network covers almost all of the urban population. The Fifth Development plan (1973-8) provided for a total coverage of the population by the First AM Radio Programme and more than 70 % coverage by the Second AM Programme.

NIRT operates a total of fourteen television production and transmission regional centres with 153 transmitters of total power in excess of 144 kw. covering eighty-eight cities and towns and 70 % of the country's population. Television transmission already includes occasional broadcasting of world events via satellite. The Fifth Plan provided for 70 % coverage by the First Programme devoted to light programming and 50 % coverage by the Second Programme committed to cultural programming. While television transmission covers about 4 million households, only about 1.7 million own their own sets.

Colour television in educational programmes started in October 1975, and in all programmes by 1978. While the technical resources for introducing colour television unquestionably existed earlier (the Asian Olympic Games of 1974 were broadcast in colour), full colour programming was delayed until 1978 in view of the domestic manufacturers' projected ability to fulfil the anticipated demand for colour television sets. The purchase of a satellite for use in educational as well as general broadcasting was under negotiation. An English channel for foreign residents in Iran (whose number had increased considerably in the seventies) started operating in autumn 1975. Radio broadcasting in major foreign languages as well as in local dialects has been a regular feature of broadcasting almost from the beginning.

The educational television station established in October 1973 covered about 75 % of the school population at the intermediate level. It transmitted more than 2,480 hours of educational programmes on Persian history and literature, foreign languages for primary and secondary schools, science, programmes for new literates, etc.

In addition to broadcasting, NIRT has engaged in an increasing number of auxiliary activities including a two-year undergraduate programme in communications arts and techniques, established in March 1970, two Master-of-Arts and Sciences level programmes in communications technology and communication arts established in 1975, a Centre for the Preservation and Propagation of Traditional Iranian Music, a Children's Music Workshop, a Theatre workshop, the City Theatre of

Tehran, the Shiraz Festival of Arts, the Asian Broadcasting Union (ABU), Shiraz Young Film-makers Festival, the NIRT Chamber Orchestra, a growing number of rural television clubs, an expanding publishing house (Soroush) and the publication of a weekly periodical (Tamasha). Research and development activities in such fields as audience research, electronic technology and socio-cultural studies were also expanding. Most of these activities have been denounced and renounced after the revolution. Moreover, Radio and Television programming has been dramatically affected by the February Revolution. Before the Revolution, NIRT broadcast the following television programmes:

- First Programme, nationwide transmission, 12 hours per day;
- Second Programme, transmission to major cities, 8 hours per day;
- Educational Programme, transmission on the Programme during off-hours;
- International Programme, transmission in two major cities (Tehran and Abadan), 8 hours per day;
- Provincial Programmes, transmission on the First and Second Programme, 1-2 hours per day.

These programmes have been reduced to the First Programme, broadcasting for a total of about 3 hours per day. Mr. Sadeg Ghotbzadeh, the first Managing Director of NIRT after the revolution, declared that television is detrimental to family life. The name of broadcasting agency has been also changed to The Voice and Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The new programme policy excludes all Western imports and domestic productions that indulge in sex or violence; it has limited itself primarily to the broadcasting of news, talk shows, and public events. Because of ousters and lay-offs, the technical quality of transmission is also reported to have deteriorated considerably.

Radio, television and telephone ownership indicators are subject to different possible estimates. Table 4.17 is based on the Population Census of 1976. Assuming a population of about 34 million in 1976, estimations for the sets per thousand of population are also given. However, it is entirely possible to consider these as an under-estimation,

particularly in the case of radio sets which may be assumed to exceed one set per household in some areas.

Radio and T.V. sets per thousand of population have been estimated elsewhere to be 330 and 60 respectively (Tehranian, 1979c). In any case, the urban-rural gaps reflected in the census data are striking and suggest the inequality of access to sources of information.

Despite these limitations, the progress of broadcasting in Iran in the past decade should be considered as phenomenal. In spite of enormous geographic barriers and severe political censorship, NIRT managed to expand rapidly its coverage of population and production of programmes. Figures 4.2 and 4.3 and Tables 4.18 and 4.22 provide a review of this progress in terms of coverage and types of programming. However, no measure of quantitative indicators can tell the true story of broadcasting, which is inextricably tied to art, culture and politics. Qualitative indicators such as those proposed earlier as well as critical reviews of its programming in the context of the country's general socio-cultural development, are therefore deeply relevant.

The Advertising Industry

The rapid expansion of a consumer society in Iran in the last two decades along with the expansion of the private sector and the media led to the emergence of a very vigorous advertising industry. Total advertising expenditure in 1974 amounted to about $ 42.5 million, which means a per capita expenditure of $ 1.49. (Iran Alamanac, 1977). If compared with such other private enterprise economies as Bahrain, Brazil, Chile, Israel, Kuwait and Lebanon, this is comparatively low (see Table 4.23). However, modern advertising in Iran should be considered as only a nascent phenomenon, that entered the scene with full force only after the mid-sixties.

Table 4.17 Ownership of Radio, T.V. and Telephone Sets in Iran, 1976.

		HOUSEHOLD OWNERS	SETS PER 1,000
RADIO	URBAN	2,460,880	155
	RURAL	1,905,000	106
	TOTAL	4,365,880	128
TELEVISION	URBAN	1,523,360	96
	RURAL	106,700	6
	TOTAL	1,630,060	48
TELEPHONE	URBAN	441,640	28
	RURAL	7,320	0.4
	TOTAL	448,960	13

SOURCE: Population Census, 1976.

Figure 4.2. Annual construction of television relay Transmitters
(Up to 21 March 1976 - Beginning of Irarian Year 2536)



Prepared by the Office of Research for Network Expansion.

Figure 4.3. Proportion of television transmitters and relay stations to population
(Up to 21 March 1977 - Beginning of Iranian Year 2536)



SOURCE: Mahmoudi, 1977.

Table 4.18 Radio Programmes in Iran (1975)

Total Transmission Time	Hours per week	Domestic Production
First Programme (countrywide)	168	88 %
Second Programme	126	45 %

N.B.: Total number of radio transmitters is 46.

SOURCE: NIRT.

Table 4.19 First Radio Programme Composition (1975)

Programme Composition	Hours per week	Percentage
A. Basic programmes; family, rural development corps. Iranian cultural programmes	23	13.5 %
B. News & News Magazine	31	18.5 %
C. Children's programmes	7	4.5 %
D. Other programmes; music, plays, contests, games, special reports	103	61 %
E. Religious programmes	4	2.5 %
T O T A L	168	100.0 %

SOURCE: NIRT.

Table 4.20 Second Radio Programme Composition (1975)

Programme Composition	Hours per week	Percentage
News	3.5	3 %
Iranian Music	9	10.5 %
Foreign Music	55	70 %
Literary, artistic and scientific programmes	22	22 %
Programmes in foreign languages	14	11 %
TOTAL	126	100.0 %

SOURCE: NIRT.

Table 4.21 Television Programmes (1975)

Total Transmission Time	Hours per week	Domestic Production %
First Programme (countrywide)	41	50 %
Second Programme (Tehran, Abadan, Isfahan, Shiraz, Mashhad)	35	25 %
Educational Television	34	90 %
Summer Programmes	3	
Television programme production per week (excluding educational television):		
A. Tehran studios	30	
B. Provincial studios (Abadan, Isfahan, Bandar Abbas, Tabriz, Rasht, Rezaieh, Sanandaj, Shiraz, Kerman, Kermanshah, Mashhad)	53	

SOURCE: NIRT.

Table 4.22 Television Programme Composition: First & Second Programmes (1975)

Programme Composition	Hours per week	Percentage
A. Basic programmes: Rural, workers, family, science, Iranian cultural, literary and art programmes	15	20
B. News: Sports, news, news magazines	9	12
C. Children's programmes, TV serials	8	10
D. Other programmes: Games, contests, programmes, films, theatre, documentary, sports, music	42.5	56
E. Commercial advertisements	1.5	2
T O T A L	76	100

SOURCE: NIRT.

Table 4.23 Per Capita Expenditures on Advertising in Selected Countries, 1974

Bahrain	$ 6.50
Brazil	8.96
Chile	3.00
Iran	1.49
Israel	19.70
Kuwait	10.78
Lebanon	9.43

SOURCE: A.M. Arbabi, Kayhan International, January 8, 1977.

The rate of increase in advertising is therefore a more significant indicator to consider in this context. Since NIRT imposed a limit of about 2-3 hours per day for advertising on its various radio and TV programmes, printed media advertising is the more relevant indicator. This rate of increase for printed media between 1972-74 was 30 %, augmenting considerably after the sudden rise in oil revenues and the subsequent spending spree. A notable omission among available data is the size and composition of government advertising, which in Iran was of considerable commercial and political significance (particularly for the maintenance of a pro-government press).

The subject composition of advertising is also important in that it provides a clue to the target audiences. In Iran, advertising on TV seemed to be primarily focused on banking, cosmetics, the national lottery and some consumer goods and durables such as shoes, washing machines, washing powder, etc. Only those industries and services advertised, which had a shortage of demand; the automobile industry thus advertised little because demand was way ahead of supply and production capacity.

The impact of advertising, either directly or indirectly through programmes that demonstrated the life styles of the foreign and domestic upper middle classes, cannot be measured with any accuracy. But its role in the revolution of rising expectations and frustrations that led to the February Revolution, cannot be denied.

Telecommunications

Like broadcasting, telecommunications in Iran has been a government monopoly and is likely to reamin so. The Ministry of Post, Telegraph and Telephone (PTT) takes the responsibility for this sector, but it has relegated some of it to government corporations such as Iran Telecommunications Corporation. As reported by Iran Yearbook (1977):

Modern telecommunications in Iran date back to the establishment of the first Morse telegraph line in 1859. The line joined the royal palace in Tehran to the Shah's summer residence in Chaman-Soltaniyyeh and was later extended to Tabriz and joined to the Russian telegraph network several years later.

The system was rapidly expanded so that by 1920, the nationwide telegraph lines totalled some 20,831 kilometers.

Ninety years ago, the first telephone line became operational in Iran, and a carrier system was set up during the Second World War.

Iran's first microwave system was completed in 1964 between Tehran and Halgheh-Dareh, covering a distance of 100 kilometers and including three relay stations. It was soon joined by the cross-country (CENTO) network, consisting of 45 stations and covering 2,300 kilometers in Iran on the Ankara-Tehran-Karachi route. The microwave system was chosen over multi-channel communication cables because of the country's geography and a number of technical advantages, and has since formed the backbone for long-distance telecommunications in Iran. The network now comprises four systems, including:

1. The CENTO (Turkey, Iran, Pakistan) cross-country network, serving Tabriz, Qazvin, Tehran, Qom, Kashan, Isfahan, Na'in, Yazd, Kerman, Bam and Zahedan. Mianeh, Zanjan, Karaj, Rafsanjan and several other cities are expected to be joined to the system shortly.

2. The Tehran-Assadabad network which has been in operation for 10 years now (1980) and is considered one of the large capacity systems in the country. Its length is 300 kilometers and has seven relaying stations en route.

3. The Isfahan-Shiraz network set up originally to meet the needs of Fars Province. Since the completion of a larger, more modern network joining these cities in Tehran, the local network is no longer considered necessary and will be removed and installed elsewhere in the country.

4. The nation-wide microwave network which includes six major lines covering 3,560 kilometers will have a final capacity of 960 telephone channels.

A fifth system has been slated to cover the entire country over a distance of 13,700 kilometres with 600 stations. It will entail the largest programme ever. Major contractors are GTE, Nippon Electric, Page and Siemens.

While the microwave network will be utilised primarily for telephone and telegraph communications, plans are also under way to transmit television and radio programmes through the network.

The country's telegraph network is being overhauled, and the old "morse code" system is being replaced with teletype and teleprinter

devices. Over 150 cities have been equipped with the new system.

Two telex systems are in operation, one in Khorramshahr and a larger automatic telex centre in Tehran.

A "Gentex" or general telegraph exchange has also been set up to handle part of the telegraph lines between Rasht, Shiraz, Isfahan, Tabriz, Khorramshahr, Abadan, Ahvaz and Mashad. The system speeds up communications by eliminating the need for a central exchange.

Finally, Iran was the first Middle Eastern country to set up a ground telecommunications satellite station at Assadabad near Hamadan. The station allows for direct contact between Iran and the United States, France, England, Germany, Italy and Switzerland and for indirect contact with much of the rest of the world.

Table 4.24 Telephone services in Selected Countries

Country	Pop. in 1970 (1000 persons)	Per Capita Income (Dollars)	No. of telephones in 1970 (1000's units)	No. of telephones per 100 persons in pop.
U.S.A.	206,800	4,235	115,222	55.7
Sweden	8,050	2,788	4,307	53.5
France	51,000	2,288	8,114	15.9
Australia	12,500	2,169	3,599	28.8
Venezuela	10,650	977	378	3.5
Argentina	24,400	838	1,668	6.8
Iraq	9,100	275	120	1.3
India	550,100	102	1,160	0.2
Iran (1970)	27,040	313	265	0.9
Iran (1975)	32,640	1,505	649	1.9

SOURCE: PBO and ICDI, 1977.

Table 4.25 Distribution of Postal Boxes in Iran by Province, 1969-75

	No. Boxes Urban 1969	No. Boxes Urban 1975	Average Yrly. Growth %	No. Boxes Rural 1969	No. Boxes Rural 1975	Average Yrly. Growth %
Total Country	2973	4946	11	5615	6435	2
Central Prov.	887	1421	10	195	652	5

SOURCE: PBO and ICDI, 1977.

Table 4.26 Domestic and Foreign Telegrams Cabled in Iran, 1966-74

Year	No. Internal Telegraphs	No. External Telegraphs	No. Telegraphs Internal & External
1966	6078	449	6527
1967	6592	474	7066
1968	6690	497	7187
1969	6936	520	7456
1970	7620	498	8118
1971	8786	598	4384
1972	8363	446	8809
1973	8884	563	9447
1974	11,715	581	12,070

SOURCE: Iran Telecommunications Corporation, PTT.

Libraries and Documentation Centers

The growth of Iranian Libraries and Documentation Centers during the last decade was respectable, though by no means commensurate with the growth in other indicators of economic growth. Tables 4.27 and 4.28 show this growth for the years 1970-77. Other indicators which would be useful in understanding the performance of libraries may include the following:

- rural/urban distribution of libraries;
- library units per unit of population;
- types of materials held and used;
- distribution by province and location;
- ratio of libraries to population density;
- types of libraries and their distribution.

Documentation and documentation centers are still in their infancy in Iran. In 1967, the Ministry of Science and Higher Education established the Institute for Scientific and Educational Research and Planning with its two affiliated organizations, Iran Documentation Center (IRANDOC) and Iran Book Processing Center (TUBROC). The latter two were charged with providing central services for scientific documentation and cataloguing to all of the country's libraries and documentation centers.

The Fifth Plan (1973-78) had set the following objectives as its targets:

- constructing a new building for national library;
- constructing 50 central libraries;
- constructing 10 public libraries - 1st grade, 150,000 volumes;
- constructing 35 public libraries - 2nd grade, 80,000 volumes;
- constructing 16 public libraries - 3rd grade, 50,000 volumes;
- constructing 302 public libraries - 4th grade;
- constructing 100 Rural libraries.

Table 4.27 Public Libraries in Iran

	Libraries		Books	
	1970-71	1976-77 (est.)	1970-71	1976-77 (est.)
Country	1560	1980	3,338,886	5,200,000
Tehran	358	400	1,608,159	2,000,000

SOURCE: National Library and NIRT's Research Committee.

Table 4.28 Public Libraries, Books and Users, 1972,77

Year	Number of Libraries	Books		Users
		Printed	Manuscripts	
1972-3	305	660,000	1,393	2,723,000
1976-77 (est.)	400	700,000	1,500	3,000,000

SOURCE: Board of Trustees of Public Libraries.

In a country with more than half its population below the age of about 17, the role of children's and school libraries is a crucial one. Table 4.29 shows the growth of the children's libraries under the auspices of the Center for the Intellectual Development of Children and Youth. Most elementary and secondary school libraries are, if they exist at all, of relatively modest means. Table 4.30 shows the size of university libraries.

A grandiose project which has been probably abandoned after the February Revolution was the project for the Construction of a multi-million dollar library, the Pahlavi Library. The plans for this library owed themselves to the 'edifice complex' so typical of the Pahlavi regime in Iran. The library was planned to be one of the largest in the world, equipped with the latest multi-media and data storage and retrieval systems and technologies, and hooked up to the major world documentation centers. In the meantime, plans for neighbourhood public, children's and rural libraries were either non-existent or extremely modest.

Tapes and Records

Tapes and records are the types of small media which have revolutionalized public communication in Iran as elsewhere in the world. (See Tehranian, 1979b; Sampson, 1979). The significance of these media lies in their unique characteristics; they are small, accessible, relatively inexpensive, mobile, transistor as well as electrical and most important of all, easy to operate and to elude the government censors. As shown elsewhere, the use of tapes, telephones, mimeographing and xeroxing played a very important part in the Iranian Revolution. (Tehranian, 1979b).

Table 4.31 shows the growth of imports and exports of pre-recorded tapes and phonograph records. Table 4.32 shows the available data on the growth of imports of record players. Both tables suggest the

Table 4.29 Children's Libraries in Iran, 1975-76

Description	Total Country		Tehran		Provinces	
	1975	1976	1975	1976	1975	1976
No. Libraries	126	142	24	28	102	114
No. Books	1,033,046	980,046	244,839	194,883	788,207	785,163
Members	417,528	350,291	47,049	92,638	370,479	257,653
No. Users	5,967,436	4,028,607	2,181,685	684,539	3,344,068	3,785,751

SOURCE: Ministry Culture & Art, Annual Report on Cultural Activities in Iran, 1976-77.

Table 4.30 Libraries of Higher Educational Institutions in Iran, 1976

Library Name	No. Books	Total Members	Librarians
Tehran University (total)	442,628	9,344	56
Aryamehr University	5,500	350	1
Sepahiyan Ingellab University	40,766	4,912	1
Teacher Training University	53,115	3,292	11
Pahlavi University	43,843	9,750	14
Jundi Shapur University	132,601	2,428	27
Azerbayejan University	31,096	2,482	6
Ferdowsi University	78,169	3,398	14
Meli University	11,156	4,609	3
Isfahan University	99,773	1,027	14
Gilan University	6,202	-	-
Azad (Free) University	10,882	-	7
Baluchistan University	1,962	1,012	-
Razi University	1,988	890	2

SOURCE: Ministry of Culture & Art, Annual Report on Cultural Activities in Iran, 1976-77.

Table 4.31 Imports and Exports of Tapes and Records in Iran, 1973-76

Year	Pre-Recorded Tapes/Imports	Phonograph Records/Imports 45 plus 33 RPM
1973	12,000	9,450
1974	18,560	22,000
1975	67,336	19,860
	Pre-Recorded Tapes/Exports	Phonograph Records/Exports
1976	11,838	373

SOURCE: Aflatouni, 1978.

Table 4.32 Imports of Record Players

Year	Imports of Record Players (by kilos weight)	Imports of Record Players (by Rials)
1968	250,000	150,000,000
1976 (first six months)	550,000	400,000,000

SOURCE: Aflatouni, 1978

presence of a strong demand. Unfortunately, statistics on the subject composition of tapes and records, their sales, and their consumers are not readily available. But indicators on such matters could provide a valuable monitoring device on cultural trends. In contrast to books, the press and broadcasting, which are inevitably affected by government censorship, commercial pressures and production constraints, tapes and records are more susceptible to consumer demand and could better reflect changing cultural trends. The last fifteen years in Iran, for instance, witnessed a great upsurge in demand and sales of religious tapes, including various Quranic verses, mournings, revolutionary sermons, etc. After the Revolution, with the curtail of movie house and entertainment programmes in radio and television, sales of audio and video-tapes are reported to have soared to as many as 20 million a year.

Information Duplication, Storage and Retrieval Systems (Information)

There are a whole host of new information technologies which have significantly affected communications systems everywhere. In the advanced industrial societies, the impact of these technologies is heralded by some observers as the emergence of a new 'post industrial' information society (Bell, 1976; Porat, 1977; Parker, 1977). In the developing countries, they have already exacerbated the existing dualism between the modern and traditional sectors of the communications system, while providing new means for oppossing the cognitive despotism of the governments. As one Tehran University professor put it, xerocacy is challenging autocracy and facilitating democracy.

'Informatics' is perhaps the most appropriate rubric under which we may identify all of these technologies, including all of the complex variety of data storage and retrieval systems (computers) and reproduction facilities. The increasing integration of the computer and telecommunication facilities is giving rise to an expanding and potentially revolutionary variety of uses, including the emerging datavision

systems in the advanced industrial societies (for a review, see Intermedia, June 1979).

In Iran, the use of computers was being introduced with increasing rapidity during the seventies. With the acquisition of the office reproduction facilities (mimeographing, xeroxing) this was beginning to have a spreading social impact on administration, education and politics. Government policy during the seventies encouraged and financed the application of informatics in a whole variety of administrative fields; it also inspired facile assumptions about the nature of administrative reform, which was sometimes assumed to be synonymous with automation. In the meantime, however, the GIGO principle (Garbage in, Garbage out) was in operation here as elsewhere. Unreliable data, once processed through computers, led to the augmentation of further unreliable data. Policy decisions were subject, in any case, to their own dynamics and often neglected unreliable or reliable data.

There are unfortunately no readily available data sources or studies on the use of informatics in Iran. One possible source for a review of the status of this field in Iran is a study undertaken by the Ministry of Industry and Mines. There is therefore a major data gap in this field which would have to be filled.

System Processes: Communication Policies, Output, Impact, Feedback

We have so far considered communication development indicators from primarily a historical point of view. Communication policy and planning, however, must assume primarily a futurist orientation. For this reason if no other projections of all of the environmental and input indicators (goals, resources and technologies) and how these will change the communication structures and structural indicators, must be considered.

This study was undertaken at a revolutionary time in Iran. It cannot therefore look into the future without an assessment of the communication development policies of the new revolutionary regime, still in a process of formation. In the previous chapters, we have alluded to some aspects of the emerging policies; a more complete assessment is still premature. Nevertheless, we may identify here those policy issues and communication indicators which must be considered in any future studies.

The communication policy issues which have to be faced are fundamentally no different from those in the recent past; the following problems stand out:

- traditionalism vs. modernism
- communication freedom vs. control and censorship
- national integration and unity vs. regional identity and autonomy
- communication professionalism vs. commercialism
- conventional vs. multi-media education
- big, capital-intensive technologies vs. small, labor intensive
- administrative centralisation vs. decentralisation
- government ownership and control of the media vs. commercial ownership and control vs. public trust ownership and control
- communication free trade vs. balanced flow of trade

- directive vs. reflective vs. permissive programming
- basic communication research vs. applied research

Decisions on these policy issues and others will be a function of the new political system in Iran; communication policies will thus be a derivative of the development policies. To monitor the process of policy formation, therefore, a study of the emerging policy makers and policy planners (communication elite) as well as of the communication structures and institutions (including political parties and voluntary associations which are of increasing importance) will be necessary. It is through the interaction of the people and their political and cultural leadership, taking place in the context of institutional change, that policies emerge.

This interaction can be studied more concretely, if we pay closer attention not only to policy pronouncements, stated often in ideological terms, but also to the output of the communication system. The products and programs of the press, broadcasting, publishing, cinema, tapes and records, informatics, etc. can be closely monitored through appropriate indicators.

Moreover, studies of the impact of communication through audience research and sociological surveys can unravel the effects, as opposed to the aims, of communication policies. Last but not the least, it is the study of feedback indicators (such as letters to the editors, informal or underground communication networks, voting or any other measure of social participation, including demonstrations and manifestations) that can provide the necessary insight into the efficacy of communication policies. A society that stifles feedback is a society that does not communicate with itself.

The new Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran sets forth a new philosophy for the mass media that is worthy of note. The Constitution proclaims six Islamic principles as the ideological foundations of the republic; these consist of towhid (the unity and sovereignty of God), nabuwwat (progressive revelation as the source of all laws),

mu'ad (Last Day of Judgement as man's evolutionary movement towards God), a'adl (Divine Justice in creation and legislation), imamat (continuous leadership through Imams in the realization of Islamic revolutionary principles), and karamat (man's worthy position in the sight of God and his freedom and responsibility before Him). Based on these principles of government, the Constitution has also two special sections (in the preamble and in the text) dealing with the mass media. The relevant paragraphs of the Preamble reads as follows:

"In the evolutionary process of the Islamic Revolution, the mass media (radio and television) shall be put at the service of propagating Islamic culture, enjoying in this respect from the encounter of different views while seriously avoiding the encouragement and propagation of destructive and anti-Islamic ideas. The principles of such a law recognize the freedom and worth of human beings as their primary aim in opening up the possibilities for man's growth and evolution. It is encumbent upon all that the Muslim community appoints competent and believing authorities with continuous supervision on their work and active participation in the construction of an Islamic society, in the hope that they may succeed in founding a model Islamic community which could serve as an example and witness to the whole world. ("And in this fashion, we sent you a community that will serve as witness to peoples". The Qur'an.).

The Constitution's Article 175 on the mass media also reads as follows: "In the mass media (radio and television) the freedom of publicity and propaganda shall be ensured according to Islamic practice. Such mass media shall work under the control of the three powers: judicial (Supreme Judicial Council), legislative and executive. The procedure for this purpose shall be determined by law".

These provisions notwithstanding, Iran's national development and communications policies are still rapidly evolving. The central problems of communication in national development continue to be those of identity, legitimacy and community. The resolution of these problems in an ethnically heterogenous, multilingual and multireligious society

such as that of Iran is not an easy task. The fundamental challenge before Iran, as elsewhere in the world, is therefore how to build a progressive, human and tolerant society without losing those delicate ties of identity, legitimacy and community which bind the requirements of modernity to the traditions of civility.

Summary and Conclusions

This study of Iran as a case in the problems and prospects of using socio-economic, cultural and communication indicators in the processes of development policy formulation and planning, although exploratory, may suggest some lessons for other developing countries. These may be summarized as follows:

1. As history in general and the particular case of Iran in recent years amply demonstrate, the processes of development are more often than not characterized by social, economic, political and cultural disequilibria and contradictions. If development indicators are to serve a useful monitoring purpose, they would have to be analytical and comprehensive, measuring the contradictory and concurrent developmental processes of accumulation, mobilization and integration (Tehranian, 1980a). In terms of social communication processes, this means that they should try to measure as best as they can (a) the development of communications (i.e. the accumulation of the communications capital and infrastructure); (b) development by communications (i.e. the social and political mobilization and participation of the diverse elements of a population into differentiated and autonomous structures of social communication institutions such as political parties, trade unions, professional societies and voluntary associations); and (c) development for communication (i.e. the level of social, economic, political and cultural integration achieved at every stage of development through those community of shared identities, ideals and interests reflected in common language, values, goals and material interests).

2. As the Iranian case further illustrates, a period of lop-sided and rapid growth in the economy and the accumulation of communications capital and infrastructure (in telecommunication and broadcasting as well as in printing and publishing facilities), combined with relatively high rates of educational growth, urbanization and social

mobilization which could not find outlets for political communication and participation, often leads to social and political disintegration and/or revolutionary upheavals.

3. Although one of the marks of underdevelopment is the paucity of comprehensive and reliable statistical time series, an attempt to collect, generate, survey and analyze what data exists as comprehensively as possible may have not only descriptive but also analytic, prescriptive and predictive value. The historical and systematic approach suggested in this case study may serve as a guideline.

4. Communications development indicators, as conceived here, are therefore essentially mechanisms of social feedback. An indicator indicates nothing except in answer to a question or sets of questions. The right question(s) and the right answers to those are not usually given by an isolated indicator, but by a set of indicators which, as a rule, express significant relationships between different variables within the socio-cultural system. If we consider communications development as a goal as well as a process, it will enable society to create its own particular way of life and its environement. (Bohner, 1979). This creative capacity is synonimous with a kind of participation that generates common feelings of identity, legitimacy and community.

5. Lack of clearly formulated hypotheses and inadequacy of empirical studies, as well as problems of boundary definition have so far retarded our understanding of the role of communications in general development. For these reasons, no precise definition of communications development indicators was given in this essay, but in the light of this case study, a working definition for future case studies may be considered as follows:

> Communication development indicators are those normative sets of quantitative (numbers) or qualitative (values: high/low, excellent/poor) data that provide a link between communications development theory, policy and planning in order to assign non-measurable values or properties to those concepts. As such, communications development indicators could provide social feedback on and participation in progress made or the bottlenecks reached on the path towards certain social objectives and targets in the field of technologically-mediated, institutionally organized or spontaneously expressed forms of social communication.

APPENDIX

PRESS LAW

(As approved by the Revolutionary Council of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 11 August 1979)

DRAFT PRESS LAW

(Passed on 20 Amordad 1358)

(11 August 1979)

Article 1. Under the terms of this law "the press" shall be taken to comprise all publications printed and published regularly, at fixed times, under a permanent name, bearing a date and issue number, which bring to the knowledge of the public items of information, news and opinions of various kinds of social, economic, political, religious, scientific, cultural or artistic matters, thus contributing towards enlightening public opinion and raising the level of knowledge in a particular field.

Article 2. Publications shall be authorized solely under the responsibility of natural persons, and provided that they are financed by Iranian capital, irrespective of whether they propagate the ideas and ideals of particular groups, associations and parties, or public information and opinions. Any person applying for an authorization to publish must comply with the following conditions:

1. Be of Iranian nationality.
2. Never have been convicted of any offence involving loss of civic rights.
3. Be of sound mind; have had no conviction for fraudulent bankruptcy or been deprived of civic rights.
4. Be of political integrity and moral competence.
5. As a minimum requirement, be in possession of a "licence" and have sufficient knowledge of the subject concerned, in

accordance with the decision of the Commission set up under Article 4 of this law.

Comment. No authorization to publish shall be granted to Prime Ministers, Ministers, Governors-General, general officers of the army, police and gendarmerie, heads of governmental organizations, administrators, chairmen of State corporations or banks, and of all corporations and establishments on whose licences their names appear, representatives of either House of Parliament (with the exception of those having given in their resignation, by order of the Leader of the Revolution), ambassadors, mayors of Tehran, members of the SAVAK, persons belonging to the former government who, between 15 Khordad 1342 and 22 Bahman 1257 (5 June 1963 and 12 February 1978), occupied any of the above-mentioned posts, and all those who during the same period were engaged in propaganda on behalf of that government through the press, radio or television, or by means of conferences and meetings.

Article 3. Applicants for a licence to publish shall be required to submit an application containing the following detailed particulars to the Ministry of National Orientation, in Tehran, or the National Orientation Services in the departments; in the absence of such a departmental service, applications should be submitted to the national administration of the chief town of the province:

1. Full particulars regarding the applicant.
2. Full particulars regarding the responsible director.
3. The name of the publication, and as appropriate its emblem.
4. The administrative headquarters of the publication.
5. The periodicity of the publication (daily, weekly, monthly, etc.).
6. The type of publication, its political position, and its guiding intellectual principles and beliefs.
7. The language of the publication.

Comment 1. A licence to publish is granted to applicants meeting all the necessary conditions.

Comment 2. As regards the implementation of regulations under this law, the administrative headquarters of the publication, specified in the application, shall also be considered as the legal domicile of the applicant or responsible director.

Comment 3. Registered parties, associations and establishments may apply for a licence to publish, on condition that they put forward a director who meets all the necessary conditions and who will personally assume full legal responsibility in accordance with this law.

Article 4. The applications submitted for a licence to publish, and the competence of the applicants, will be examined as described below, by a commission consisting of qualified persons faithful to the Islamic Revolution of Iran:

1. A delegate representing press publishers;
2. A representative of press editors;
3. An adviser from the Supreme Court of Appeal, nominated by the President of the Court;
4. A professor from the University of Tehran, nominated by the President of the University Council;
5. A member of the teaching staff of the Feyzieh Theological College in Qom, proposed by the council of professors of the College;
6. A first-ranking practising lawyer, chosen by the Bar Council;
7. The Assistant Secretary or General Director for the Press of Ministry of National Orientation, acting as secretary to the Commission, though without the right to vote. After carrying out the necessary examination, the Commission shall communicate its opinion to the Ministry of National Orientation for a final decision to be taken.

Comment 1. In the case of a divergence of views between the Ministry of National Orientation and the Commission, the person concerned may lodge a complaint with the Court of Appeal. The decision of the

Court shall be final and without appeal.

Comment 2. The choice of the representatives of press publishers and editors shall be made in accordance with regulations to be approved by the Council of Ministers.

Comment 3. Pending the establishment of the Commission for which provision is made under this law, its functions shall be discharged by a provisional commission comprising the Minister of National Orientation, a Judge from the Supreme Court of Appeal, to be chosen by the President of the Court, and a representative of the Council of the Islamic Revolution of Iran.

Article 5. An applicant for a licence to publish shall propose to the Ministry of National Orientation a person who shall be the director responsible at law for the publication and who, in addition to meeting the conditions stipulated in Article 2, shall as a minimum requirement possess the necessary scientific and professional competence, as confirmed by the Commission to be set up under Article 4, or by the Ministry of National Orientation, in accordance with the procedure specified in Comment 3 under that Article. An applicant for a licence may also act as responsible director, provided that he meets all the necessary conditions.

Comment. Where the publication has both an editor and a director responsible at law, the same conditions shall be required of both of them.

Article 6. The holder of a licence to produce a publication may publish more than one under the same name, provided that he indicates a separate director individually responsible for each publication.

Article 7. It is incumbent on the Ministry of National Orientation, within three months from receipt of the application, to carry out the necessary investigation and examination concerning the competence of the applicant, the responsible director and the editor, taking

into account the conditions specified in this law, and to notify the rejection or approval of the application. In the case of applications which have been approved, the Ministry of National Orientation shall issue a licence within one month from the date of approval, as necessary in accordance with Comment 3 under Article 4.

Article 8. No change in the licence to publish, and no transfer of the publication, shall be made without the agreement of the Ministry of National Orientation, in accordance with the implementing regulations under this law.

Article 9. If the director responsible for the publication does not meet the conditions stipulated in Comments 1, 2, 3 and 4 under Article 2 of this law, or in the event of his death or resignation, the holder of the licence shall be required, within one month at the latest, to propose to the Ministry of National Orientation another person meeting all the necessary conditions. In default thereof the issuance of the publication will be prohibited. Pending confirmation of the competence of the new responsible director, the holder of the licence shall be required to discharge the latter's responsibilities.

Article 10. Should the holder of the licence fail to fulfil any of the conditions stipulated in Comments 1, 2, 3 and 4 under Article 2 of this law, the licence to publish shall be cancelled by a decision of the Commission referred to in Article 4, in accordance with the comments under that Article.

Comment 1. The person concerned may lodge a complaint with the Court of Appeal against the Ministry of National Orientation in respect of Articles 7, 9 and 10. The judgement of the Court shall be final and without appeal.

Comment 2. In the event of the decease of the holder of a licence, a licence shall be issued to the applicant meeting all the necessary conditions, with the written agreement of the majority of his heirs, or their legal representative, under the conditions specified

by this law.

Comment 3. The right to exploit the name of the publication shall belong to the heirs; in the event of a proposed transfer of the publication to other parties, the heirs shall be required to obtain advance approval from the Ministry of National Orientation.

Article 11. The holder of a licence shall produce the publication within six months from the date of obtaining the licence; in default of compliance with this rule, his licence will cease to be valid. The licence will be cancelled if the publication fails to appear regularly over one year without any valid excuse.

Comment 1. The rights granted to current publications under old regulations are still valid, provided that the licensee regularizes his situation in respect of the new law and obtains a licence within three months. Licensees who, under the former government, sold back their licence to the government, may benefit from this provision provided that they refund the money paid from public funds.

Comment 2. The name, address and other particulars of publications for which a licence has been issued shall be entered, and the date recorded, in a special register kept by the Ministry of National Orientation.

Article 12. Each issue of the publication shall contain on a set page and at a set place the names of the holder of the licence, the responsible director and the editor, and shall also indicate the character of the publication, for example whether it is of a religious, scientific, political, economic, literary or artistic nature. The printing firm shall also be bound to comply with this provision.

Comment. Publications shall be required to notify the Ministry of National Orientation each month in writting of the number of copies sold.

Article 13. All journals or periodicals shall keep a special sealed account book as required by law, and shall enter their expenses and income therein; they shall also provide an annual statement of expenses and income to the Ministry of National Orientation. The Ministry has powers to inspect the accounts of such establishments whenever it considers it necessary.

Article 14. Directors responsible for publications shall be required, both in Tehran and in the departments, to forward two copies of each issue regularly to the National Library, the Library of the Madjlis, the Office of the Public Prosecutor and the Ministry of National Orientation (Home Press Department and Documentation Centre).

Article 15. If newspapers publish insulting or libellous comments without foundation in respect of either a natural or a legal person, that person has the right to reply within one month, and to send his reply to the publication concerned. The latter shall be required to publish this explanatory reply, free of charge, in one of the two issues published immediately after receipt of the reply, on the same page, in the same column, and in the same print used for the publication of the insulting or libellous article, and does not itself contain offensive or libellous comments on any individual. Should the publication again print comments of this nature, the person concerned retains the right to reply. If the publication prints only part of the reply, so that it appears to be curtailed or incomprehensible, and similarly if it makes an addition to the reply, the insertion of the reply will be regarded as invalid. The text of the reply must be published on the same page. Replies from candidates before and during elections must be published in the issue immediately following, provided that the reply has been received at the newspaper's offices, and acknowledged, at least six hours before the publication is printed.

Article 16. If the publication refuses to insert the reply, or if it does not publish it, the party claiming redress may appeal to the public prosecutor of the court of first degree. If the latter finds that the complaint has merit, he will issue an injunction for the pu-

blication to insert the reply; if the injunction is not observed, the documents in the case shall be forwarded to the court for a temporary suspension of the publication not exceeding one week.

Article 17. It is the responsible director who assumes responsibility for the articles and information printed in the publication. Where articles or information harm the interests of individuals, and give rise to complaints, the responsible director shall name the writer of the article or information, and be answerable for him, unless it has been proved that the responsible director has fulfilled all his obligations and discharged all his normal responsibilities; in that event, responsibility reverts to the person originally to blame.

Article 18. Any person who in time of war reveals in a journal o periodical confidential instructions, army secrets, or plans of forts or military fortifications, shall be sentenced to imprisonment for one to three years; in peacetime, the penalty incurred will be six months' to one year's imprisonment.

Article 19. If any person encourages or incites others, through a journal or periodical, to commit offences or crimes against the internal or external security of the country which are covered by provisions of the penal code, and if the incitation is followed by consequences, that person will be punished as an accessory: if the incitation has had no consequence, he will be sentenced to three to six months' imprisonment, or to the payment of a fine ranging from 100,000 to 300,000 rials.

Article 20. Anyone giving offence through the press to the holy religion of Islam, or holy persons of Islam, or of the other official religions of the country, shall be sentenced to six months' to two years' imprisonment.

Article 21. If scurrilous or libellous articles or information, or matter contrary to truth and reality, are published in a journal, periodical or any other publication, either written by the editor him-

self or quoted, concerning recognized religious leaders or ulemas, the director of the journal and the writer shall both be held responsible, and each shall be liable to a summary sentence of one to three years' imprisonment.

Article 22. Any publication publishing scurrilous comments concerning the Leader of the Islamic Revolution of Iran will be suspended for a period of one to six months.

Comment. Examination of the offences specified in Articles 19, 20 and 21, does not necessarily require the institution of civil proceedings.

Article 23. The publication of photographs, pictures and texts which offend public decency shall be prohibited, as also the publication of confidential matters pertaining to the civil courts or investigations by the judicial authorities which are protected by legislation relating to official secrets; in the event of a violation of this provision, the publication concerned will be suspended for a period of from one to three months, and the offender will be given a summary sentence of from three to six months' imprisonment, or sentenced to a fine ranging from 200,000 to one million rials.

Article 24. The publication shall be prohibited of any texts or information containing false accusations, scurrilous abuse or language, offensive allusions or other similar matter in respect of individuals. Anyone guilty of such an offence shall be given a summary sentence of from three months' to one year's imprisonment. The prosecution of such offences shall be instituted by the filling of a civil suit. In the event of the suit being withdrawn, the prosecution shall proceed no further.

Comment 1. In cases of this kind the plaintiff (whether a natural or a legal person) may claim material and moral damages resulting from these offences.

Comment 2. If the publication of the information or material referred to in the above-mentioned Article concerns a deceased person, each of the heirs may bring a civil or criminal action.

Article 25. Anyone threatening a second party through the press with damaging his reputation or honour, or revealing private confidential matters about that party, shall be sentenced summarily to a period of from three months' to one year's imprisonment, and to the payment of a fine of from 20 to 100 thousand rials.

Comment. As regards Articles 24 and 25, the publication against which a complaint is lodged shall not be entitled to print any matter whatsoever relating to the case under investigation so long as the case is before the examining magistrate. In the event of a violation of this rule, the court of first degree is empowered, even before the completion of the investigation, to request the correctional court to issue a warrant of arrest in respect of the offending publication; the court shall take immediate action, as an extraordinary measure, and without the representative of the public prosecutor being present, giving instructions for the suspension of three issues of the publication; this measure shall take effect in respect of the first issue after the instruction has been communicated. In the event of a repeated offence, the court shall suspend the appearance of the publication until it has given judgement.

Article 26. Anyone fraudulently pretending in a publication to be the holder of the authorization to publish, or to be the responsible director or editor, or publishing a journal without having the necessary authorization, shall be sentenced to a period of from three to six months' imprisonment. The provisions of this Article shall also apply to holders of authorizations, responsible directors and editors who have by law been dismissed from their posts.

Article 27. Any publication counterfeiting in the slightest degree the name or emblem of another publication, in such a way as to create confusion for readers, shall be suspended, and the offender sentenced to a period of six to three months' imprisonment and to the payment of a fine

of 100,000 to 300,000 rials. Proceedings will be instituted only where a civil action has been brought.

Article 28. The issuance of any other publication whose name, emblem or format can be confused with that of the suspended publication is prohibited by law; any such publication shall be imemdiately seized. The offender shall be sentenced to a period of from three to six months' imprisonment.

Article 29. Anyone in a position of governmental authority attempting to exert pressure on the mass media, or to censor or control publications with a view to having a piece of information or article printed, shall be liable to be dismissed for life from public office, and shall in addition be sentenced from six months to two years' imprisonment.

Article 30. Offences committed by the press shall be judged by an Assize Court in the presence of a jury.

Article 31. The members of the jury shall be chosen as follows: a commission shall be constituted to appoint the members of the jury once every two years, in the Iranian month of Mehr (23 September - 22 October), in Tehran, at the invitation of the Ministry of National Orientation, in the presence of the members of the courts of first degree and the President of the Town Council (or the Major, in the absence of the President of the Town Council); in the provincial capitals, this commission shall meet at the invitation of the Governor-General and shall consist of the Chief Justice and the President of the Town Council (the Major of the town, if there is no Town Council), and the representative of the Ministry of National Orientation; the commission shall nominate fourteen persons in all, worthy of the confidence of the public, from various groups of society (the clergy, university professors, doctors, writers, journalists, lawyers, secondary teachers, primary teachers, craftsment, representatives of guilds, workers, farmers), seven of them as main members and the other seven as deputy members.

Article 32. Members of the jury must meet the following conditions:

- be at least 30 years old;
- have no criminal record;
- be trustworthy, honest and of good reputation.

Article 33. After the selection of jurors, the Ministry of National Orientation in Tehran, and the Governor-General in the provinces, shall forward the list of jurors to the chief judge of the Courts of Appeal.

Article 34. In all proceedings against the press, the Assize Court shall request the fourteen members of the jury, at its preliminary session, in the presence of the prosecutor or his representative, to be present at the hearings. In any case the tribunal shall not meet in public session except in the presence of seven members of the jury, who shall be required to be present until the completion of the hearings.

Article 35. Any member of the jury absenting himself from the hearings without a valid reason, or abstaining from taking part in the decisions to be taken, shall be prohibited by order of the tribunal from being a member of the jury for a period of two months.

Article 36. The cases in which jurors may be disqualified are the same as those in which the law makes provision for exception to be taken to the appointment of a magistrate.

Article 37. Any juror having questions to ask during a hearing shall do so in writing, and shall forward the questions to the tribunal for examination by the president.

Article 38. For the examination of the offences described in draft law, the Assize Court shall meet with the participation of its president and two judges, in the presence of the jury; it shall then

carry out an examination of the offences, in accordance with the general provisions; immediately upon completion of the hearing, the jury shall deliberate and take a decision relating to the following two questions:

(a) Is the accused guilty?

(b) If he is guilty, are there extenuating circumstances?

The jury shall then reach its verdict and make it known to the tribunal in writing; its decision shall be taken by a majority vote. The tribunal shall then give judgement on the basis of the verdict. Where the verdict brought in is "guilty", it is the responsibility of the tribunal to assess the degree of guilt in relation to the law, pronounce sentence and determine any other legal considerations involved.

If the tribunal finds the accused guilty, the latter may appeal in accordance with legal regulations; if he is acquitted, no appeal is possible.

Article 39. In the event of an acquittal or a sentence which does not involve loss of civic rights, any prohibition order made against the publication shall be immediately withdrawn, and the publication shall be allowed to reappear.

Article 40. The preparation of the implementing regulations for this law shall be the responsibility of the Ministry of National Orientation. The regulations will be prepared in such a way that the application of this law will be the responsibility of corporate bodies, except in respect of matters which concern the sovereignty of the government.

Article 41. All laws and regulations contrary to this draft law shall be annulled as from the date of its approval; the Ministry of National Orientation shall be responsible for the implementation of this draft law.

Additional comment on Article 7, adopted on 10.7.1358 by the Commission for Draft Legislation of the Revolutionary Islamic Council, and approved by the Council of the Islamic Revolution of Iran: "Should the Commission for which provision is made in Article 4 of this law be unable, within the period of time stipulated in that Article, to apply the provisions in the comment on Article 2 relating to the applicant, the licence shall be granted notwithstanding; but should it be established at any time that the applicant comes within the category in question, or should he fail to meet any of the conditions laid down in Article 2, the authorization for his publication shall be cancelled without any compensatory payment".

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